Continuing the war without use of an atomic bomb would take significantly more time and cost thousands of American lives. Overall, the best course of action would have been to end the war quickly by using an atomic bomb on Japan and guaranteeing Japan's surrender.World War II, after the explosion of the atom bomb in August 1945, Hiroshima, Japan. The United States, then, dropped the bombs to end the war that Japan had unleashed in Asia in 1931 and But our quarrel is not really with the use of the atomic bombs specifically, but with the attitude towards...If ending the war quickly was the most important motivation of Truman and his advisers to what extent did they see an atomic diplomacy capability as Nor is it an attempt to substitute for the extraordinary rich literature on the atomic bombings and the end of World War II. Nor does it include any of the...Beginning of World War II. In 1945, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, ending World War II. Google Classroom.The first atomic bomb was used in battle 68 years ago in Hiroshima, Japan. Nearly 200,000 people were killed, including those who died in the aftermath. The decision by the United States to use the atomic bomb against Japan in August 1945 is credited with ending World War II.
Obama in Hiroshima: Why the U.S. Dropped the Bomb in 1945 | Time
In world war 2, an atomic bomb was created. Not only did it end the war, it also brought upon thousands of problems for civilization. Along with the bombing of Bikini Atoll (where the US claimed that the bombing was just a test of military exercise and study, many believe that this act was just to...Atomic bombs have been used only twice in war—both times by the United States against Japan at the end of World War II, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Atomic bombs are weapons that get their energy from fission reactions. Thermonuclear weapons, or hydrogen bombs, rely on a combination of...UNCONDITIONAL The Japanese Surrender in World War II By Marc Gallicchio. Conservatives believed the left in the United States was more determined to use unconditional surrender In 1995, a half-century after the war, the debate was reignited when curators at the Smithsonian Institution tried...America's use of atomic bombs to attack the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August The atomic bombs were horrible but I agree with US secretary of war Henry L Stimson that using them Richard B Frank is a military historian whose books include Downfall: The End of the Imperial...
The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II | Manhattan Project
Well in World War 2 Japan had took on the idea that they shall die before dishonor, even the Women and Children. The United States dropped that nuke as looking at Atomic bombs were not necessary to end the war, but they shortened the war by at least a year and probably saved millions of lives."The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended World War II. There can be no doubt of that. While they brought death and destruction on It was a view that generated controversy then and after as to the justification or otherwise of the use of such weapons on largely defenceless civilian...The bomb brought World War Two to a sudden end, but was it right to use it? Why did America use the bomb? Conclusion of the war. They said that to continue the war for weeks or months with conventional bombing and a US land invasion could have caused millions of Japanese deaths.If ending the war quickly was the most important motivation of Truman and his advisers to what extent did they see an "atomic diplomacy" capability Nor is it an attempt to substitute for the extraordinary rich literature on the atomic bombings and the end of World War II. Nor does it include any of the...at the end of the world war (WW2) the atomic bomb was used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After WW2 the atomic bomb was further developed and "was used as a silent threat against USSR" until 1949 when they had their own atomic bomb. From that year there was an arms race which played a...
Washington, D.C., August 4, 2020 – To mark the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the National Security Archive is updating and reposting one of its most popular e-books of the past 25 years.
While U.S. leaders hailed the bombings at the time and for many years afterwards for bringing the Pacific war to an end and saving untold hundreds of American lives, that interpretation has since been seriously challenged. Moreover, moral questions have shrouded the bombings which caused horrible human losses and in succeeding many years fed a nuclear fingers race with the Soviet Union and now Russia and others.
Three-quarters of a century on, Hiroshima and Nagasaki stay emblematic of the risks and human costs of conflict, particularly the use of nuclear guns. Since those issues might be topics of scorching debate for many more years, the Archive has once once more refreshed its compilation of declassified U.S. govt paperwork and translated Japanese records that first seemed on those pages in 2005.
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Introduction By William BurrThe seventy fifth anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 is an instance for sober reflection. In Japan and in other places round the world, every anniversary is seen with nice solemnity. The bombings had been the first time that nuclear guns have been detonated in fight operations. They led to horrible human losses and destruction at the time and extra deaths and illness in the years ahead from the radiation effects. And the U.S. bombings hastened the Soviet Union's atomic bomb undertaking and feature fed a big-power nuclear hands race to this present day. Thankfully, nuclear weapons have not been exploded in war since 1945, most likely owing to the taboo in opposition to their use shaped by the dropping of the bombs on Japan.
Along with the ethical issues eager about the use of atomic and different mass casualty weapons, why the bombs were dropped in the first place has been the topic of occasionally heated debate.As with all events in human historical past, interpretations vary and readings of primary sources can result in other conclusions. Thus, the extent to which the bombings contributed to the end of World War II or the beginning of the Cold War remain reside problems. A significant contested query is whether or not, underneath the weight of a U.S. blockade and large conventional bombing, the Japanese had been able to surrender earlier than the bombs have been dropped. Also still debated is the affect of the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria, compared to the atomic bombings, on the Japanese resolution to surrender. Counterfactual problems are also disputed, as an example whether there have been choices to the atomic bombings, or would the Japanese have surrendered had an illustration of the bomb been used to produced shock and awe. Moreover, the function of an invasion of Japan in U.S. making plans remains an issue of debate, with some arguing that the bombings spared many 1000's of American lives that in a different way would had been lost in an invasion.
Those and other questions shall be topics of discussion well into the indefinite long term. Interested readers will continue to take in the interesting historic literature on the matter. Some will wish to learn declassified primary resources so they may be able to further develop their very own thinking about the issues. Toward that end, in 2005, at the time of the sixtieth anniversary of the bombings, personnel at the National Security Archive compiled and scanned a significant number of declassified U.S. executive paperwork to lead them to extra extensively to be had. The paperwork cover more than one sides of the bombings and their context. Also incorporated, to offer a wider point of view, have been translations of Japanese paperwork not broadly available ahead of. Since 2005, the assortment has been updated. This newest iteration of the assortment includes corrections, a couple of minor revisions, and updated footnotes to remember recently published secondary literature.
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2015 UpdateAugust 4, 2015 – A couple of months after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, General Dwight D. Eisenhower commented all through a social instance "how he had was hoping that the war might have ended without our having to use the atomic bomb." This just about unknown evidence from the diary of Robert P. Meiklejohn, an assistant to Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, revealed for the first time nowadays by way of the National Security Archive, confirms that the long term President Eisenhower had early misgivings about the first use of atomic weapons through the United States. General George C. Marshall is the most effective high-level authentic whose contemporaneous (pre-Hiroshima) doubts about using the guns towards towns are on report.
On the 70th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, the National Security Archive updates its 2005 newsletter of the most comprehensive on-line collection of declassified U.S. government documents on the first use of the atomic bomb and the end of the war in the Pacific. This update gifts up to now unpublished material and translations of difficult-to-find data. Included are paperwork on the early levels of the U.S. atomic bomb undertaking, Army Air Force General Curtis LeMay's report on the firebombing of Tokyo (March 1945), Secretary of War Henry Stimson's requests for amendment of unconditional surrender terms, Soviet paperwork in terms of the occasions, excerpts from the Robert P. Meiklejohn diaries discussed above, and choices from the diaries of Walter J. Brown, particular assistant to Secretary of State James Byrnes.
The original 2005 posting included a wide range of subject matter, together with formerly top secret "Magic" summaries of intercepted Japanese communications and the first-ever full translations from the Japanese of accounts of high point meetings and discussions in Tokyo resulting in the Emperor's choice to give up. Also documented are U.S. choices to focus on Japanese cities, pre-Hiroshima petitions through scientists questioning the military use of the A-bomb, proposals for demonstrating the effects of the bomb, debates over whether to switch unconditional surrender phrases, studies from the bombing missions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and belated top-level consciousness of the radiation results of atomic weapons.
The documents can assist readers to make up their very own minds about long-standing controversies equivalent to whether or not the first use of atomic weapons was justified, whether President Harry S. Truman had possible choices to atomic assaults for ending the war, and what the impact of the Soviet declaration of war on Japan was. Since the 1960s, when the declassification of important sources started, historians have engaged in full of life debate over the bomb and the end of World War II. Drawing on sources at the National Archives and the Library of Congress in addition to Japanese materials, this electronic briefing book includes key documents that historians of the events have relied upon to provide their findings and advance their interpretations.
The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II: A Collection of Primary Sources
Seventy years ago this month, the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and the Japanese govt surrendered to the United States and its allies. The nuclear age had actually begun with the first army use of atomic guns. With the subject material that follows, the National Security Archive publishes the maximum comprehensive online collection so far of declassified U.S. executive paperwork on the atomic bomb and the end of the war in the Pacific. Besides subject matter from the recordsdata of the Manhattan Project, this assortment includes previously "Top Secret Ultra" summaries and translations of Japanese diplomatic cable traffic intercepted beneath the "Magic" program. Moreover, the collection comprises for the first time translations from Japanese resources of excessive point meetings and discussions in Tokyo, together with the conferences when Emperor Hirohito licensed the ultimate determination to give up.[1]
Ever since the atomic bombs had been exploded over Japanese cities, historians, social scientists, reporters, World War II veterans, and atypical electorate have engaged in intense controversy about the occasions of August 1945. John Hersey's Hiroshima, first revealed in the New Yorker in 1946 encouraged unsettled readers to query the bombings whilst church groups and a few commentators, most prominently Norman Cousins, explicitly criticized them. Former Secretary of War Henry Stimson discovered the criticisms troubling and printed an influential justification for the attacks in Harper's.[2] During the Nineteen Sixties the availability of primary assets made ancient research and writing possible and the debate turned into extra energetic. Historians Herbert Feis and Gar Alperovitz raised looking out questions about the first use of nuclear guns and their broader political and diplomatic implications. The controversy, especially the arguments made through Alperovitz and others about "atomic diplomacy" temporarily changed into caught up in heated debates over Cold War "revisionism." The controversy simmered over the years with main contributions by Martin Sherwin and Barton J. Bernstein but it turned into explosive right through the mid-1990s when curators at the National Air and Space Museum met the wrath of the Air Force Association over a proposed historic showcase on the Enola Gay.[3] The NASM showcase was greatly scaled-down yet historians and journalist persevered to interact in the debate. Alperovitz, Bernstein, and Sherwin made new contributions as did different historians, social scientists, and newshounds including Richard B. Frank, Herbert Bix, Sadao Asada, Kai Bird, Robert James Maddox, Sean Malloy, Robert P. Newman, Robert S. Norris, Tsuyoshi Hagesawa, and J. Samuel Walker.[4]
The continued controversy has revolved round the following, amongst different, questions:
had been the atomic strikes vital basically to avert an invasion of Japan in November 1945? Did Truman authorize the use of atomic bombs for diplomatic-political reasons-- to intimidate the Soviets--or was once his primary function to power Japan to surrender and produce the war to an early end? If finishing the war quickly was the maximum necessary motivation of Truman and his advisers to what extent did they see an "atomic international relations" capacity as a "bonus"? To what extent did subsequent justification for the atomic bomb exaggerate or misuse wartime estimates for U.S. casualties stemming from an invasion of Japan? Were there alternatives to the use of the guns? If there were, what have been they and the way plausible are they on reflection? Why had been choices no longer pursued? How did the U.S. government plan to make use of the bombs? What ideas did war planners use to choose goals? To what extent had been senior officials all in favour of taking a look at choices to urban goals? How familiar used to be President Truman with the concepts that led goal planners chose main towns as objectives? What did senior officials learn about the results of atomic bombs sooner than they were first used. How a lot did peak officials learn about the radiation results of the weapons? Did President Truman come to a decision, in a strong sense, to use the bomb or did he inherit a choice that had already been made? Were the Japanese in a position to give up earlier than the bombs have been dropped? To what extent had Emperor Hirohito extended the war unnecessarily by means of now not seizing alternatives for give up? If the United States were extra flexible about the demand for "unconditional give up" via explicitly or implicitly making certain a constitutional monarchy would Japan have surrendered previous than it did? How decisive used to be the atomic bombings to the Japanese decision to surrender? Was the bombing of Nagasaki unnecessary? To the extent that the atomic bombing was once critically essential to the Japanese decision to surrender would it not were enough to ruin one metropolis? Would the Soviet declaration of war have been sufficient to compel Tokyo to confess defeat? Was the dropping of the atomic bombs morally justifiable?This compilation won't attempt to answer these questions or use primary assets to stake out positions on any of them. Nor is it an attempt to replace for the extraordinary wealthy literature on the atomic bombings and the end of World War II. Nor does it come with any of the interviews, documents ready after the events, and post-World War II correspondence, and so on. that members in the debate have brought to endure in framing their arguments. Originally this assortment did not include documents on the origins and building of the Manhattan Project, even if this updated posting contains some significant data for context. By offering access to a large vary of U.S. and Japanese paperwork, basically from the spring and summer time of 1945, readers can see for themselves the an important source material that scholars have used to form narrative accounts of the ancient developments and to frame their arguments about the questions that have provoked controversy over the years. To assist readers who're much less familiar with the debates, commentary on some of the documents will point out, even though far from comprehensively, some of the ways in which they have been interpreted. With direct get entry to to the paperwork, readers would possibly broaden their own solutions to the questions raised above. The paperwork can even provoke new questions.
Contributors to the historical controversy have deployed the documents decided on right here to improve their arguments about the first use of nuclear weapons and the end of World War II. The editor has carefully reviewed the footnotes and endnotes in a wide range of articles and books and decided on documents cited via contributors on the more than a few sides of the controversy.[5] While the editor has a point of view on the problems, to the biggest extent conceivable he has attempted to not let that affect file selection, e.g., through selectively withholding or including documents that might buttress one level of view or the different. The process of compilation involved consultation of primary assets at the National Archives, principally in Manhattan Project information held in the data of the Army Corps of Engineers, Record Group 77, but also in the archival information of the National Security Agency. Private collections have been also important, corresponding to the Henry L. Stimson Papers held at Yale University (even if available on microfilm, as an example, at the Library of Congress) and the papers of W. Averell Harriman at the Library of Congress. To an ideal extent the documents decided on for this compilation have been declassified for years, even a long time; the most recent declassifications were in the Nineteen Nineties.
The U.S. paperwork cited here will likely be acquainted to many knowledgeable readers on the Hiroshima-Nagasaki controversy and the history of the Manhattan Project. To supply a fuller picture of the transition from U.S.-Japanese antagonism to reconciliation, the editor has finished what might be finished inside of time and useful resource constraints to present knowledge on the activities and issues of view of Japanese policymakers and diplomats. This features a number of formerly height secret summaries of intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications, which allow readers to shape their very own judgments about the course of Japanese international relations in the weeks prior to the atomic bombings. Moreover, to shed light on the issues that caused Japan's give up, this briefing e-book includes new translations of Japanese primary assets on the most important occasions, including accounts of the conferences on August 9 and 14, where Emperor Hirohito made selections to simply accept Allied phrases of give up.
[Editor's Note: Originally ready in July 2005 this posting has been updated, with new paperwork, adjustments in group, and different editorial changes. As noted, some documents with regards to the origins of the Manhattan Project were included along with entries from the Robert P. Meiklejohn diaries and translations of a couple of Soviet paperwork, among other pieces. Moreover, fresh important contributions to the scholarly literature were taken under consideration.]
Read the documents
Documents 1A-C: Report of the Uranium Committee
1A. Arthur H. Compton, National Academy of Sciences Committee on Atomic Fission, to Frank Jewett, President, National Academy of Sciences, 17 May 1941, Secret
1B. Report to the President of the National Academy of Sciences through the Academy Committee on Uranium, 6 November 1941, Secret
1C. Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development, to President Roosevelt, 27 November 1941, Secret
Source: National Archives, Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Record Group 227 (hereinafter RG 227), Bush-Conant papers microfilm collection, Roll 1, Target 2, Folder 1, "S-1 Historical File, Section A (1940-1941)."
This set of paperwork considerations the work of the Uranium Committee of the National Academy of Sciences, an exploratory project that was once the lead-up to the precise manufacturing effort undertaken by way of the Manhattan Project. The initial report, May 1941, confirmed how main American scientists grappled with the attainable of nuclear energy for military purposes. At the outset, 3 chances have been envisioned: radiological warfare, an influence supply for submarines and ships, and explosives. To produce subject material for any of those functions required a capability to split uranium isotopes as a way to produce fissionable U-235. Also vital for the ones features was once the production of a nuclear chain response. At the time of the first report, more than a few methods for producing a sequence reaction have been envisioned and money used to be being budgeted to try them out.
Later that yr, the Uranium Committee completed its report and OSRD Chairman Vannevar Bush reported the findings to President Roosevelt: As Bush emphasised, the U.S. findings were extra conservative than those in the British MAUD file: the bomb could be fairly "less efficient," would take longer to provide, and at a higher price. One of the report's key findings was once that a fission bomb of superlatively destructive continual will end result from bringing temporarily in combination a sufficient mass of detail U235." That was once a walk in the park, "as certain as any untried prediction primarily based upon idea and experiment will also be." The critically vital process was to increase techniques and way to separate highly enriched uranium from uranium-238. To get manufacturing going, Bush sought after to determine a "moderately selected engineering staff to review plans for possible production." This was the basis of the Top Policy Group, or the S-1 Committee, which Bush and James B. Conant briefly established.[6]
In its dialogue of the results of an atomic weapon, the committee considered each blast and radiological damage. With admire to the latter, "It is conceivable that the harmful effects on lifestyles caused by means of the intense radioactivity of the products of the explosion is also as vital as those of the explosion itself." This insight used to be overlooked when peak officers of the Manhattan Project regarded as the targeting of Japan all the way through 1945.[7]
Documents 2A-B: Going Ahead with the Bomb
2A: Vannevar Bush to President Roosevelt, 9 March 1942, with memo from Roosevelt hooked up, 11 March 1942, Secret
2B: Vannevar Bush to President Roosevelt, 16 December 1942, Secret (file no longer hooked up)
Sources: 2A: RG 227, Bush-Conant papers microfilm assortment, Roll 1, Target 2, Folder 1, "S-1 Historical File, Section II (1941-1942): 2B: Bush-Conant papers, S-1 Historical File, Reports to and Conferences with the President (1942-1944)
The Manhattan Project never had an reputable charter organising it and defining its challenge, but those two paperwork are the purposeful identical of a constitution, in phrases of presidential approvals for the venture, to not point out for a huge finances. In a development document, Bush informed President Roosevelt that the bomb venture was on a pilot plant foundation, yet no longer but at the manufacturing stage. By the summer time, as soon as "production crops" could be at work, he proposed that the War Department take over the undertaking. In answer, Roosevelt wrote a short memo endorsing Bush's concepts as long as absolute secrecy may well be maintained. According to Robert S. Norris, this was "the fateful choice" to show over the atomic undertaking to military control.[8]
Some months later, with the Manhattan Project already underway and underneath the path of General Leslie Grove, Bush defined to Roosevelt the effort important to supply six fission bombs. With the purpose of having sufficient fissile subject material via the first half of 1945 to produce the bombs, Bush was once frightened that the Germans might get there first. Thus, he sought after Roosevelt's instructions as as to whether the mission must be "vigorously driven all through." Unlike the pilot plant proposal described above, Bush described a real production order for the bomb, at an estimated cost of a "serious determine": $Four hundred million, which was an optimistic projection given the eventual price of 1.Nine billion. To keep the secret, Bush sought after to steer clear of a "ruinous" appropriations request to Congress and requested Roosevelt to invite Congress for the vital discretionary finances. Initialed through President Roosevelt ("VB OK FDR"), this may increasingly had been the closest that he got here to a formal approval of the Manhattan Project.
Document 3: Memorandum by means of Leslie R. Grove, "Policy Meeting, 5/5/43," Top Secret
Source: National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter RG 77), Manhattan Engineering District (MED), Minutes of the Military Policy Meeting (5 May 1943), Correspondence ("Top Secret") of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, microfilm publication M1109 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1980), Roll 3, Target 6, Folder 23, "Military Policy Committee, Minutes of Meetings"
Before the Manhattan Project had produced any guns, senior U.S. govt officers had Japanese goals in mind. Besides discussing programmatic matters (e.g., standing of gaseous diffusion crops, heavy water production for reactors, and staffing at Las Alamos), the members agreed that the first use may well be Japanese naval forces concentrated at Truk Harbor, an atoll in the Caroline Islands. If there used to be a misfire the weapon would be demanding for the Japanese to get better, which might no longer be the case if Tokyo used to be focused. Targeting Germany used to be rejected as a result of the Germans were thought to be much more likely to "safe wisdom" from a faulty weapon than the Japanese. That is, the United States could possibly be in peril if the Nazis bought extra wisdom about find out how to construct a bomb.[9]
Document 4: Memo from General Groves to the Chief of Staff [Marshall], "Atomic Fission Bombs – Present Status and Expected Progress," 7 August 1944, Top Secret, excised reproduction
Source: RG 77, Correspondence ("Top Secret") of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, document 25M
This memorandum from General Groves to General Marshall captured how a ways the Manhattan Project had are available in lower than two years since Bush's December 1942 report back to President Roosevelt. Groves did not point out this but around the time he wrote this the Manhattan Project had running at its far-flung installations over 125,000 folks ; taking into consideration excessive labor turnover some 485,000 other people labored on the project (1 out of each 250 folks in the nation at that time). What these other people have been laboring to construct, directly or indirectly, had been two types of guns—a gun-type weapon using U-235 and an implosion weapon using plutonium (even if the risk of U-235 was once also into consideration). As the scientists had learned, a gun-type weapon according to plutonium used to be "inconceivable" because that detail had an "surprising property": spontaneous neutron emissions would purpose the weapon to "fizzle."[10] For both the gun-type and the implosion weapons, a manufacturing schedule were established and both can be to be had all through 1945. The discussion of weapons results centered on blast harm models; radiation and other effects had been overlooked.
Document 5: Memorandum from Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, Office of Scientific Research and Development, to Secretary of War, September 30, 1944, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, Harrison-Bundy Files (H-B Files), folder 69 (reproduction from microfilm)
While Groves apprehensive about the engineering and manufacturing problems, key War Department advisers had been changing into troubled over the diplomatic and political implications of these significantly tough guns and the dangers of a global nuclear hands race. Concerned that President Roosevelt had an overly "cavalier" belief about the risk of keeping up a post-war Anglo-American atomic monopoly, Bush and Conant known the limits of secrecy and sought after to disabuse senior officials of the perception that an atomic monopoly used to be conceivable. To suggest possible choices, they drafted this memorandum about the importance of the world change of data and global inspection to stem bad nuclear festival.[11]
Documents 6A-D: President Truman Learns the Secret:
6A: Memorandum for the Secretary of War from General L. R. Groves, "Atomic Fission Bombs," April 23, 1945
6B: Memorandum discussed with the President, April 25, 1945
6C: [Untitled memorandum by General L.R. Groves, April 25, 1945
6D: Diary Entry, April 25, 1945
Sources: A: RG 77, Commanding General's report no. 24, tab D; B: Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress); C: Source: Record Group 200, Papers of General Leslie R. Groves, Correspondence 1941-1970, field 3, "F"; D: Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Soon after he was once sworn in as president following President Roosevelt's loss of life, Harry Truman realized about the top secret Manhattan Project from a briefing from Secretary of War Stimson and Manhattan Project chief General Groves, who went via the "again door" to flee the watchful press. Stimson, who later wrote up the meeting in his diary, also prepared a discussion paper, which raised broader policy issues related to the forthcoming ownership of "the most horrible weapon ever identified in human historical past." In a background file prepared for the assembly, Groves equipped an in depth assessment of the bomb mission from the raw fabrics to processing nuclear fuel to assembling the weapons to plans for using them, which were beginning to crystallize.
With appreciate to the level about assembling the guns, the first gun-type weapon "will have to be able about 1 August 1945" whilst an implosion weapon would also be available that month. "The goal is and was at all times anticipated to be Japan." The query whether Truman "inherited assumptions" from the Roosevelt administration that that the bomb could be used has been a debatable one. Alperovitz and Sherwin have argued that Truman made "a real resolution" to use the bomb on Japan by way of opting for "between more than a few bureaucracy of diplomacy and conflict." In distinction, Bernstein found that Truman "by no means puzzled [the] assumption" that the bomb would and will have to be used. Norris also famous that "Truman's `determination' used to be a choice to not override previous plans to use the bomb."[12]
Document 7: Commander F. L. Ashworth to Major General L.R. Groves, "The Base of Operations of the 509th Composite Group," February 24, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5g
The pressure of B-29 nuclear supply cars that was once being readied for first nuclear use—the Army Air Force's 509th Composite Group—required an operational base in the Western Pacific. In late February 1945, months sooner than atomic bombs were able to be used, the high command selected Tinian, an island in the Northern Marianas Islands, for that base.
Document 8: Headquarters XXI Bomber Command, "Tactical Mission Report, Mission No. 40 Flown 10 March 1945,"n.d., Secret
Source: Library of Congress, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-36
As part of the war with Japan, the Army Air Force waged a marketing campaign to spoil primary commercial facilities with incendiary bombs. This record is General Curtis LeMay's file on the firebombing of Tokyo--"the maximum damaging air raid in history"--which burned down over Sixteen sq. miles of the metropolis, killed up to 100,000 civilians (the legit determine was 83,793), injured more than 40,000, and revamped 1 million homeless. [13] According to the "Foreword," the purpose of the raid, which dropped 1,665 tons of incendiary bombs, was once to damage commercial and strategic goals "no longer to bomb indiscriminately civilian populations." Air Force planners, on the other hand, did not distinguish civilian workers from the commercial and strategic constructions that they were trying to smash.
The killing of employees in the urban-industrial sector was once one of the specific targets of the air campaign against Japanese cities. According to a Joint Chiefs of Staff document on Japanese target techniques, anticipated results from the bombing campaign incorporated: "The absorption of man-hours in restore and aid; the dislocation of exertions by casualty; the interruption of public services necessary to production, and above all the destruction of factories engaged in war business." While Stimson would later carry questions about the bombing of Japanese towns, he was largely disengaged from the details (as he used to be with atomic focused on).[14]
Firebombing raids on different cities followed Tokyo, including Osaka, Kobe, Yokahama, and Nagoya, but with fewer casualties (many civilians had fled the towns). For some historians, the urban fire-bombing technique facilitated atomic concentrated on by making a "new ethical context," through which previous proscriptions against intentional focused on of civilians had eroded.[15]
Document 9: Notes on Initial Meeting of Target Committee, May 2, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5d (replica from microfilm)
On 27 April, army officials and nuclear scientists met to discuss bombing techniques, standards for target variety, and total venture requirements. The dialogue of "to be had objectives" integrated Hiroshima, the "largest untouched target now not on the 21st Bomber Command priority listing." But other targets were into account, including Yawata (northern Kyushu), Yokohama, and Tokyo (even if it was practically "rubble.") The problem was that the Air Force had a coverage of "laying waste" to Japan's towns which created stress with the purpose of reserving some city goals for nuclear destruction. [16]
Document 10: Memorandum from J. R. Oppenheimer to Brigadier General Farrell, May 11, 1945
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5g (reproduction from microfilm)
As director of Los Alamos Laboratory, Oppenheimer's precedence used to be generating a deliverable bomb, yet now not so much the effects of the weapon on the other people at the goal. In conserving with General Groves' emphasis on compartmentalization, the Manhattan Project professionals on the effects of radiation on human biology had been at the MetLab and other places of work and had no interaction with the manufacturing and focused on units. In this quick memorandum to Groves' deputy, General Farrell, Oppenheimer defined the want for precautions as a result of of the radiological dangers of a nuclear detonation. The initial radiation from the detonation can be deadly inside a radius of about 6/10ths of a mile and "injurious" inside of a radius of a mile. The point used to be to stay the bombing undertaking workforce protected; worry about radiation effects had no impact on focused on choices. [17]
Document 11: Memorandum from Major J. A. Derry and Dr. N.F. Ramsey to General L.R. Groves, "Summary of Target Committee Meetings on 10 and 11 May 1945," May 12, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5d (reproduction from microfilm)
Scientists and officials held additional dialogue of bombing undertaking requirements, together with top of detonation, weather, radiation results (Oppenheimer's memo), plans for conceivable challenge abort, and the more than a few facets of goal variety, including priority towns ("a large city subject of more than 3 miles diameter") and psychological dimension. As for goal cities, the committee agreed that the following must be exempt from Army Air Force bombing so they would be to be had for nuclear targeting: Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and Kokura Arsenal. Japan's cultural capital, Kyoto, would no longer keep on the checklist. Pressure from Secretary of War Stimson had already taken Kyoto off the list of goals for incendiary bombings and he would effectively object to the atomic bombing of that metropolis. [18]
Document 12: Stimson Diary Entries, May 14 and 15, 1945
Source: Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
On May 14 and 15, Stimson had a number of conversations involving S-1 (the atomic bomb); all the way through a talk with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, he estimated that ownership of the bomb gave Washington an incredible benefit—"held all the cards," a "royal directly flush"-- in dealing with Moscow on post-war issues: "They can't get alongside with out our lend a hand and industries and we now have getting into action a weapon which might be distinctive." The subsequent day a dialogue of divergences with Moscow over the Far East made Stimson wonder whether the atomic bomb would be in a position when Truman met with Stalin in July. If it used to be, he believed that the bomb could be the "grasp card" in U.S. international relations. This and different entries from the Stimson diary (as well as the entry from the Davies diary that follows) are necessary to arguments developed by Gar Alperovitz and Barton J. Bernstein, amongst others, even though with significantly other emphases, that in gentle of controversies with the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe and other areas, peak officers in the Truman administration believed that possessing the atomic bomb would supply them with important leverage for inducing Moscow's acquiescence in U.S. goals.[19]
Document 13: Davies Diary entry for May 21, 1945
Source: Joseph E. Davies Papers, Library of Congress, box 17, 21 May 1945
While officials at the Pentagon continued to look carefully at the drawback of atomic objectives, President Truman, like Stimson, was once serious about the diplomatic implications of the bomb. During a conversation with Joseph E. Davies, a distinguished Washington attorney and former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Truman mentioned that he sought after to prolong talks with Stalin and Churchill till July when the first atomic device were tested. Alperovitz treated this entry as proof in give a boost to of the atomic international relations argument, yet other historians, starting from Robert Maddox to Gabriel Kolko, have denied that the timing of the Potsdam convention had anything else to do with the goal of using the bomb to intimidate the Soviets.[20]
Document 14: Letter, O. C. Brewster to President Truman, 24 May 1945, with note from Stimson to Marshall, 30 May 1945, hooked up, secret
Source: Harrison-Bundy Files in relation to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1942-1946, microfilm publication M1108 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1980), File 77: "Interim Committee - International Control."
In what Stimson referred to as the "letter of an honest man," Oswald C. Brewster sent President Truman a profound research of the risk and unfeasibility of a U.S. atomic monopoly. [21] An engineer for the Kellex Corporation, which used to be keen on the gasoline diffusion venture to counterpoint uranium, Brewster identified that the purpose used to be fissile subject matter for a weapon. That goal, he feared, raised terrifying potentialities with implications for the "inevitable destruction of our provide day civilization." Once the U.S. had used the bomb in struggle other great powers would not tolerate a monopoly through any country and the sole possessor can be "be the most hated and feared nation on earth." Even the U.S.'s closest allies would want the bomb as a result of "how may just they know the place our friendship might be 5, ten, or 20 years therefore." Nuclear proliferation and hands races would be certain that until the U.S. labored towards global supervision and inspection of nuclear plants.
Brewster advised that Japan could be used as a "goal" for a "demonstration" of the bomb, which he did not additional outline. His implicit choice, then again, was for non-use; he wrote that it could be better to take U.S. casualties in "conquering Japan" than "to convey upon the world the tragedy of unrestrained aggressive production of this subject matter."
Document 15: Minutes of Third Target Committee Meeting – Washington, May 28, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5d (copy from microfilm)
More updates on coaching missions, goal selection, and prerequisites required for a hit detonation over the target. The goal would be a city--either Hiroshima, Kyoto (nonetheless on the record), or Niigata--but particular "aiming points" would not be specified at that time nor would business "pin point" goals as a result of they have been likely to be on the "fringes" a city. The bomb would be dropped in the city's center. "Pumpkins" referred to brilliant orange, pumpkin-shaped excessive explosive bombs—fashioned like the "Fat Man" implosion weapon--used for bombing run take a look at missions.
Document 16: General Lauris Norstad to Commanding General, XXI Bomber Command, "509th Composite Group; Special Functions," May 29, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5g (replica from microfilm)
The 509th Composite Group's cover story for its secret mission used to be the preparation of "Pumpkins" to be used in combat. In this memorandum, Norstad reviewed the advanced necessities for making ready B-29s and their staff for successful nuclear strikes.
Document 17: Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, "Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshal May 29, 1945 – 11:Forty five p.m.," Top Secret
Source: Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson ("Safe File"), July 1940-September 1945, field 12, S-1
Tacitly dissenting from the Targeting Committee's recommendations, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall argued for initial nuclear use against a clear-cut army target corresponding to a "large naval set up." If that did not work, manufacturing spaces may well be targeted, but only after warning their inhabitants. Marshall noted the "opprobrium which might keep on with from an sick regarded as employment of such drive." This document has performed a role in arguments advanced through Barton J. Bernstein that figures similar to Marshall and Stimson had been "stuck between an older morality that antagonistic the intentional killing of non-combatants and a newer one that wired just about general war."[22]
Document 18: "Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting Thursday, 31 May 1945, 10:00 A.M. to 1:15 P.M. – 2:15 P.M. to 4:15 P.M., " n.d., Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B information, folder no. 100 (replica from microfilm)
With Secretary of War Stimson presiding, members of the committee heard experiences on a wide range of Manhattan Project problems, including the levels of building of the atomic project, problems of secrecy, the possibility of informing the Soviet Union, cooperation with "like-minded" powers, the military impact of the bomb on Japan, and the downside of "unwanted scientists." Interested in producing the "biggest mental impact," the Committee contributors agreed that the "most fascinating goal could be a very important war plant using a large number of workers and intently surrounded through workers' houses." Exactly how the mass deaths of civilians would convince Japanese rulers to surrender was once not discussed. Bernstein has argued that this target choice represented an uneasy endorsement of "terror bombing"--the goal was not completely army or civilian; however, worker's housing would come with non-combatant men, women, and kids.[23] It is conceivable that Truman used to be knowledgeable of such discussions and their conclusions, although he clung to a belief that the potential goals had been strictly military.
Document 19: General George A. Lincoln to General Hull, June 4, 1945, enclosing draft, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, American-British-Canadian Top Secret Correspondence, Box 504, "ABC 387 Japan (15 Feb. 45)
George A. Lincoln, chief of the Strategy and Policy Group at U.S. Army's Operations Department, commented on a memorandum by way of former President Herbert Hoover that Stimson had passed on for research. Hoover proposed a compromise answer with Japan that would permit Tokyo to retain section of its empire in East Asia (together with Korea and Japan) so to head off Soviet influence in the region. While Lincoln believed that the proposed peace groups have been militarily appropriate he doubted that they had been workable or that they may check Soviet "enlargement" which he noticed as an inescapable outcome of World War II. As to how the war with Japan would end, he saw it as "unpredictable," but speculated that "it will take Russian access into the war, combined with a landing, or approaching risk of a touchdown, on Japan proper via us, to persuade them of the hopelessness of their situation." Lincoln derided Hoover's casualty estimate of 500,000. J. Samuel Walker has cited this document to make the level that "opposite to revisionist assertions, American policymakers in the summer season of 1945 were a ways from certain that the Soviet invasion of Manchuria would be sufficient in itself to drive a Japanese surrender." [24]
Document 20: Memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, Interim Committee Secretary, to Mr. Harrison, June 6, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 100 (replica from microfilm)
In a memorandum to George Harrison, Stimson's special assistant on Manhattan Project matters, Arneson noted actions taken at the fresh Interim Committee meetings, including target criterion and an assault "with out prior warning."
Document 21: Memorandum of Conference with the President, June 6, 1945, Top Secret
Source: Henry Stimson Papers, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Stimson and Truman started this assembly through discussing how they should handle a war with French President DeGaulle over the movement by means of French forces into Italian territory. (Truman finally bring to a halt military aid to France to compel the French to drag back). [25] As obtrusive from the dialogue, Stimson strongly disliked de Gaulle whom he considered "psychopathic." The dialog soon grew to become to the atomic bomb, with some dialogue about plans to inform the Soviets yet simplest after a a success test. Both agreed that the risk of a nuclear "partnership" with Moscow would depend on "quid professional quos": "the settlement of the Polish, Rumanian, Yugoslavian, and Manchurian problems."
At the end, Stimson shared his doubts about concentrated on cities and killing civilians thru subject bombing because of its affect on the U.S.'s popularity as well as on the drawback of finding objectives for the atomic bomb. Barton Bernstein has additionally pointed to this as additional proof of the influence on Stimson of an "an older morality." While excited about the U.S.'s recognition, Stimson did not need the Air Force to bomb Japanese cities so totally that the "new weapon shouldn't have an excellent background to turn its power," a remark that made Truman snort. The dialogue of "field bombing" can have reminded him that Japanese civilians remained at chance from U.S. bombing operations.
Document 22: Memorandum from Arthur B. Compton to the Secretary of War, enclosing "Memorandum on `Political and Social Problems,' from Members of the `Metallurgical Laboratory' of the University of Chicago," June 12, 1945, Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B recordsdata, folder no. 76 (replica from microfilm)
Physicists Leo Szilard and James Franck, a Nobel Prize winner, had been on the body of workers of the "Metallurgical Laboratory" at the University of Chicago, a cover for the Manhattan Project program to produce gasoline for the bomb. The outspoken Szilard was once now not eager about operational work on the bomb and General Groves kept him beneath surveillance but Met Lab director Arthur Compton found Szilard helpful to have round. Concerned with the long-run implications of the bomb, Franck chaired a committee, during which Szilard and Eugene Rabinowitch have been main contributors, that produced a file rejecting a wonder attack on Japan and really useful as a substitute a demonstration of the bomb on the "desert or a barren island." Arguing that a nuclear fingers race "will probably be on in earnest not later than the morning after our first demonstration of the lifestyles of nuclear weapons," the committee noticed global control as the alternative. That possibility could be demanding if the United States made first army use of the weapon. Compton raised doubts about the recommendations but steered Stimson to review the file. Martin Sherwin has argued that the Franck committee shared a very powerful assumption with Truman et al.--that an "atomic assault in opposition to Japan would `surprise' the Russians"--but drew totally other conclusions about the import of such a surprise. [26]
Document 23: Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew to the President, "Analysis of Memorandum Presented through Mr. Hoover," June 13, 1945
Source: Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson ("Safe File"), July 1940-September 1945, box 8, Japan (After December 7/41)
A former ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew's intensive wisdom of Japanese politics and tradition informed his stance toward the thought of unconditional give up. He believed it very important that the United States claim its intention to keep the establishment of the emperor. As he argued on this memorandum to President Truman, "failure on our part to elucidate our intentions" on the standing of the emperor "will insure prolongation of the war and cost a large number of human lives." Documents like this have performed a role in arguments advanced by way of Alperovitz that Truman and his advisers had alternatives to using the bomb reminiscent of editing unconditional give up and that anti-Soviet issues weighed most closely of their thinking. By contrast, Herbert P. Bix has steered that the Japanese management would "doubtless no longer" have surrendered if the Truman management had spelled out the standing of the emperor.[27]
Document 24: Memorandum from Chief of Staff Marshall to the Secretary of War, 15 June 1945, enclosing "Memorandum of Comments on `Ending the Japanese War,'" ready by way of George A. Lincoln, June 14, 1945, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson ("Safe File"), July 1940-September 1945, field 8, Japan (After December 7/41)
Commenting on some other memorandum by Herbert Hoover, George A. Lincoln mentioned war targets, face-saving proposals for Japan, and the nature of the proposed declaration to the Japanese government, together with the downside of defining "unconditional surrender." Lincoln argued against enhancing the thought of unconditional give up: whether it is "phrased so as to invite negotiation" he saw risks of prolonging the war or a "compromise peace." J. Samuel Walker has seen that those risks assist provide an explanation for why senior officials were unwilling to modify the demand for unconditional give up.[28]
Document 25: Memorandum by J. R. Oppenheimer, "Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons," June 16, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B information, folder no. 76 (copy from microfilm)
In a report back to Stimson, Oppenheimer and colleagues on the medical advisory panel--Arthur Compton, Ernest O. Lawrence, and Enrico Fermi—tacitly disagreed with the record of the "Met Lab" scientists. The panel argued for early military use but not prior to informing key allies about the atomic project to open a discussion on "how we will cooperate in making this construction contribute to advanced world members of the family."
Document 26: "Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945 at 1530," Top Secret
Source: Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Decimal Files, 1942-1945, field 198 334 JCS (2-2-45) Mtg 186th-194th
With the devastating fight for Okinawa polishing off, Truman and the Joint Chiefs stepped again and regarded as what it could take to protected Japan's surrender. The discussion depicted a Japan that, by way of 1 November, would be with reference to defeat, with great destruction and financial losses produced by means of aerial bombing and naval blockade, yet no longer able to capitulate. Marshall believed that the latter required Soviet entry and an invasion of Kyushu, even suggesting that Soviet entry might be the "decisive motion levering them into capitulation." Truman and the Chiefs reviewed plans to land troops on Kyushu on 1 November, which Marshall believed was crucial because air chronic used to be not decisive. He believed that casualties would now not be more than the ones produced by the combat for Luzon, some 31,000. This account hints at dialogue of the atomic bomb ("sure other matters"), yet no documents expose that phase of the meeting.
The document of this meeting has figured in the complex debate over the estimates of casualties stemming from a conceivable invasion of Japan. While post-war justifications for the bomb urged that an invasion of Japan could have produced very excessive levels of casualties (dead, wounded, or lacking), from masses of hundreds to a million, historians have vigorously debated the extent to which the estimates have been inflated. [29]
According to accounts according to post-war reminiscences and interviews, all the way through the assembly McCloy raised the possibility of polishing off the war by way of ensuring the preservation of the emperor albeit as a constitutional monarch. If that failed to influence Tokyo, he proposed that the United States reveal the secret of the atomic bomb to secure Japan's unconditional surrender. While McCloy later recalled that Truman expressed passion, he stated that Secretary of State Byrnes squashed the proposal because of his opposition to any "offers" with Japan. Yet, in step with Forrest Pogue's account, when Truman requested McCloy if he had any comments, the latter opened up a dialogue of nuclear weapons use by way of asking "Why no longer use the bomb?"[30]
Document 27: Memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, Interim Committee Secretary, to Mr. Harrison, June 25, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. 100 (reproduction from microfilm)
For Harrison's convenience, Arneson summarized key decisions made at the 21 June assembly of the Interim Committee, together with a advice that President Truman use the approaching conference of allied leaders to tell Stalin about the atomic challenge. The Committee additionally reaffirmed earlier suggestions about the use of the bomb at the "earliest alternative" in opposition to "twin goals." In addition, Arneson integrated the Committee's advice for revoking section two of the 1944 Quebec agreement which stipulated that the neither the United States nor Great Britain would use the bomb "towards third parties with out each other's consent." Thus, an impulse for unilateral keep an eye on of nuclear use decisions predated the first use of the bomb.
Document 28: Memorandum from George L. Harrison to Secretary of War, June 26, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED, H-B information, folder no. 77 (replica from microfilm)
Reminding Stimson about the objections of some Manhattan challenge scientists to army use of the bomb, Harrison summarized the basic arguments of the Franck report. One advice shared by means of many of the scientists, whether or not they supported the document or no longer, was once that the United States inform Stalin of the bomb sooner than it was used. This proposal had been the matter of positive dialogue by means of the Interim Committee on the grounds that Soviet confidence was once essential to make imaginable post-war cooperation on atomic power.
Document 29: Memorandum from George L. Harrison to Secretary of War, June 28, 1945, Top Secret, enclosing Ralph Bard's "Memorandum on the Use of S-1 Bomb," June 27, 1945
Source: RG 77, MED, H-B information, folder no. 77 (replica from microfilm)
Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard joined those scientists who sought to avoid army use of the bomb; he proposed a "preliminary warning" so that the United States would retain its position as a "nice humanitarian country." Alperovitz cites proof that Bard mentioned his proposal with Truman who informed him that he had already totally tested the problem of complex warning. This document has additionally figured in the argument framed by means of Barton Bernstein that Truman and his advisers took it with no consideration that the bomb was once a legitimate weapon and that there used to be no explanation why to discover choices to military use. Bernstein, however, notes that Bard later denied that he had a meeting with Truman and that White House appointment logs improve that claim.[31]
Document 30: Memorandum for Mr. McCloy, "Comments re: Proposed Program for Japan," June 28, 1945, Draft, Top Secret
Source: RG 107, Office of Assistant Secretary of War Formerly Classified Correspondence of John J. McCloy, 1941-1945, field 38, ASW 387 Japan
Despite the pastime of some senior officers reminiscent of Joseph Grew, Henry Stimson, and John J. McCloy in enhancing the idea of unconditional surrender so that the Japanese could be positive that the emperor would be preserved, it remained a highly contentious subject. For instance, one of McCloy's aides, Colonel Fahey, argued against modification of unconditional surrender (see "Appendix 'C`").
Document 31: Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to Colonel Stimson, June 29, 1945, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson ("Safe File"), July 1940-September 1945, field 8, Japan (After December 7/41)
McCloy used to be part of a drafting committee at work on the text of a proclamation to Japan to be signed by way of heads of state at the coming near near Potsdam conference. As McCloy noticed the maximum contentious issue was once whether or not the proclamation should come with language about the preservation of the emperor: "This might reason repercussions at home yet with out it those that appear to understand the maximum about Japan feel there would be very little chance of acceptance."
Document 32: Memorandum, "Timing of Proposed Demand for Japanese Surrender," June 29, 1945, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson ("Safe File"), July 1940-September 1945, box 8, Japan (After December 7/41)
Probably the paintings of General George A. Lincoln at Army Operations, this report was once ready a couple of weeks prior to the Potsdam convention when senior officials have been starting to finalize the textual content of the declaration that Truman, Churchill, and Chiang would factor there. The author really useful issuing the declaration "simply earlier than the bombardment program [in opposition to Japan] reaches its peak." Next to that recommendation, Stimson or anyone in his rapid workplace, wrote "S1", implying that the atomic bombing of Japanese towns was highly relevant to the timing issue. Also related to Japanese interested by give up, the author speculated, was the Soviet assault on their forces after a declaration of war.
Document 33: Stimson memorandum to The President, "Proposed Program for Japan," 2 July 1945, Top Secret
Source: Naval Aide to the President Files, box 4, Berlin Conference File, Volume XI - Miscellaneous papers: Japan, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library
On 2 July Stimson introduced to President Truman a proposal that he had labored up with colleagues in the War Department, including McCloy, Marshall, and Grew. The proposal has been characterized as "the most comprehensive try by way of any American policymaker to leverage international relations" in order to shorten the Pacific War. Stimson had in mind a "carefully timed caution" delivered prior to the invasion of Japan. Some of the key components of Stimson's argument had been his assumption that "Japan is vulnerable to explanation why" and that Japanese might be much more inclined to give up if "we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty." The risk of a Soviet assault could be part of the "risk." As part of the risk message, Stimson alluded to the "inevitability and completeness of the destruction" which Japan may just endure, but he did not make it clean whether or not unconditional surrender phrases must be clarified ahead of using the atomic bomb. Truman read Stimson's proposal, which he mentioned was "robust," but made no commitments to the main points, e.g., the position of the emperor. [32]
Document 34: Minutes, Secretary's Staff Committee, Saturday Morning, July 7, 1945, 133d Meeting, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 353, Records of Interdepartmental and Intradepartmental Committees, Secretary's Staff Meetings Minutes, 1944-1947 (reproduction from microfilm)
The possibility of editing the concept of unconditional surrender so that it guaranteed the continuation of the emperor remained hotly contested inside the U.S. govt. Here senior State Department officials, Under Secretary Joseph Grew on one facet, and Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish on the different, engaged in hot debate.
Document 35: Combined Chiefs of Staff, "Estimate of the Enemy Situation (as of 6 July 1945, C.C.S 643/3, July 8, 1945, Secret (Appendices Not Included)
Source: RG 218, Central Decimal Files, 1943-1945, CCS 381 (6-4-45), Sec. 2 Pt. 5
This overview of Japanese functions and intentions portrays an financial system and society beneath "tremendous strain"; however, "the flooring component of the Japanese militia stays Japan's largest military asset." Alperovitz sees statements on this estimate about the impact of Soviet access into the war and the chance of a conditional surrender involving survival of the emperor as an institution as extra proof that the policymakers saw alternatives to nuclear weapons use. By distinction, Richard Frank takes observe of the estimate's depiction of the Japanese army's terms for peace: "for surrender to be appropriate to the Japanese military it might be essential for the military leaders to believe that it might no longer entail discrediting the warrior custom and that it might permit the ultimate resurgence of a military in Japan." That, Frank argues, would have been "unacceptable to any Allied coverage maker."[33]
Document 36: Cable to Secretary of State from Acting Secretary Joseph Grew, July 16, 1945, Top Secret
Source: Record Group 59, Decimal Files 1945-1949, 740.0011 PW (PE)/7-1645
On the eve of the Potsdam Conference, a State Department draft of the proclamation to Japan contained language which modified unconditional surrender by means of promising to retain the emperor. When former Secretary of State Cordell Hull discovered about it he outlined his objections to Byrnes, arguing that it could be better to wait "the climax of allied bombing and Russia's entry into the war." Byrnes used to be already vulnerable to reject that part of the draft, yet Hull's argument can have bolstered his decision.
Document 37: Letter from Stimson to Byrnes, enclosing memorandum to the President, "The Conduct of the War with Japan," 16 July 1945, Top Secret
Source: Henry L. Stimson Papers (MS 465), Sterling Library, Yale University (reel 113) (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Still all for looking for ways to "warn Japan into give up," this represents an strive by means of Stimson ahead of the Potsdam convention, to persuade Truman and Byrnes to agree to issue warnings to Japan prior to the use of the bomb. The warning would draw on the draft State-War proclamation to Japan; probably, the one criticized by way of Hull (above) which included language about the emperor. Presumably the clarified warning would be issued previous to the use of the bomb; if the Japanese persevered in preventing then "the full force of our new guns should be dropped at endure" and a "heavier" caution can be issued backed by the "exact front of the Russians in the war." Possibly, as Malloy has argued, Stimson was once motivated by concerns about using the bomb against civilians and cities, yet his newest proposal would meet resistance at Potsdam from Byrnes and other.[34]
Document 38: R. E. Lapp, Leo Szilard et al., "A Petition to the President of the United States," July 17, 1945
Source: RG 77, MED Records, H-B recordsdata, folder no. 76 (reproduction from microfilm)
On the eve of the Potsdam convention, Leo Szilard circulated a petition as phase of a final effort to deter military use of the bomb. Signed via about 68 Manhattan Project scientists, principally physicists and biologists (copies with the ultimate signatures are in the archival file), the petition didn't explicitly reject military use, yet raised questions about an arms race that military use may instigate and asked Truman to publicize detailed terms for Japanese surrender. Truman, already on his method to Europe, never saw the petition.[35]
Documents 39A-B: Magic
39A: William F. Friedman, Consultant (Armed Forces Security Agency), "A Short History of U.S. COMINT Activities," 19 February 1952, Top Secret
39B:"Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1204 – July 12, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Sources: A: National Security Agency Mandatory declassification evaluation release; B: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18
Beginning in September 1940, U.S. military intelligence began to decrypt mechanically, beneath the "Purple" code-name, the intercepted cable visitors of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Collectively the decoded messages had been known as "Magic." How this happened is defined in an inner historical past of pre-war and World War II Army and Navy code-breaking activities prepared by William F. Friedman, a central determine in the building of U.S. executive cryptology throughout the 20th century. The National Security Agency saved the 'Magic" diplomatic and armed forces summaries classified for a few years and didn't free up the whole sequence for 1942 thru August 1945 till the early Nineteen Nineties.[36]
The 12 July 1945 "Magic" abstract includes a record on a cable from Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow relating to the Emperor's decision to hunt Soviet help in ending the war. Not understanding that the Soviets had already made a commitment to their Allies to declare war on Japan, Tokyo fruitlessly pursued this feature for a number of weeks. The "Magic" intercepts from mid-July have figured in Gar Alperovitz's argument that Truman and his advisers identified that the Emperor was able to capitulate if the Allies confirmed more flexibility on the call for for unconditional give up. This level is central to Alperovitz's thesis that peak U.S. officers recognized a "two-step logic": relaxing unconditional surrender and a Soviet declaration of war would were sufficient to induce Japan's give up without the use of the bomb.[37]
Document 40: John Weckerling, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, July 12, 1945, to Deputy Chief of Staff, "Japanese Peace Offer," 13 July 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: RG 165, Army Operations OPD Executive File #17, Item 13 (replica courtesy of J. Samuel Walker)
The day after the Togo message was reported, Army intelligence leader Weckerling proposed a number of conceivable explanations of the Japanese diplomatic initiative. Robert J. Maddox has cited this file to reinforce his argument that peak U.S. officials identified that Japan was once now not on the subject of give up because Japan was looking to "stave off defeat." In a close research of this document, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, who is also skeptical of claims that the Japanese had made up our minds to surrender, argues that each of the three possibilities proposed by means of Weckerling "contained a component of fact, yet none was totally correct". For instance, the "governing clique" that supported the peace strikes used to be not trying to "stave off defeat" but was searching for Soviet assist to end the war.[38]
Document 41: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1205 – July 13, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18
The day after he advised Sato about the present considering on Soviet mediation, Togo asked the Ambassador to see Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and inform him of the Emperor's "non-public aim to send Prince Konoye as a Special Envoy" to Moscow. Before he received Togo's message, Sato had already met with Molotov on some other subject.
Document 42: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1210 – July 17, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
Another intercept of a cable from Togo to Sato shows that the Foreign Minister rejected unconditional give up and that the Emperor used to be not "asking the Russian's mediation in anything else like unconditional surrender." Incidentally, this "`Magic' Diplomatic Summary" signifies the huge scope and functions of the program; for instance, it includes translations of intercepted French messages (see pages 8-9).
Document 43: Admiral Tagaki Diary Entry for July 20, 1945
Source: Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 916-917 [Translation by way of Hikaru Tajima]
In 1944 Navy minister Mitsumasa Yonai ordered rear admiral Sokichi Takagi to go on in poor health depart so that he may undertake a secret undertaking to be able to end the war. Tagaki was soon at the heart of a cabal of Japanese protection officials, civil servants, and academics, which concluded that, in the end, the emperor must "impose his decision on the military and the govt." Takagi kept an in depth account of his actions, section of which used to be in diary shape, the other section of which he stored on index cards. The subject material reproduced right here gives a way of the state of play of Foreign Minister Togo's attempt to secure Soviet mediation. Hasegawa cited it and different paperwork to make a bigger point about the lack of ability of the Japanese govt to agree on "concrete" proposals to negotiate an end to the war.[39]
The very last thing discusses Japanese contacts with representatives of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Switzerland. The connection with "our contact" may discuss with Bank of International Settlements economist Pers Jacobbson who was once involved with Japanese representatives to the Bank in addition to Gero von Gävernitz, then on the personnel, yet with non-official quilt, of OSS station chief Allen Dulles. The contacts never went a ways and Dulles never received encouragement to pursue them.[40]
Document 44: Letter from Commissar of State Security First Rank, V. Merkulov, to People's Commissar for Internal Affairs L. P. Beria, 10 July 1945, Number 4305/m, Top Secret (translation by means of Anna Melyaskova)
Source: L.D. Riabev, ed., Atomnyi Proekt SSSR (Moscow: izd MFTI, 2002), Volume 1, Part 2, 335-336
This 10 July 1945 letter from NKVD director V. N. Merkulov to Beria is an example of Soviet efforts to assemble within data on the Manhattan Project, even supposing no longer all the detail used to be correct. Merkulov reported that the United States had scheduled the check of a nuclear device for that identical day, even if the precise test came about 6 days later. According to Merkulov, two fissile fabrics were being produced: element-49 (plutonium), and U-235; the check tool used to be fueled by means of plutonium. The Soviet source reported that the weight of the tool used to be Three tons (which was in the ball park) and forecast an explosive yield of Five kilotons. That figure was once in response to underestimates by way of Manhattan Project scientists: the actual yield of the take a look at software used to be 20 kilotons.
As indicated by way of the L.D. Riabev's notes, it is imaginable that Beria's copy of this letter ended up in Stalin's papers. That the unique replica is lacking from Beria's papers suggests that he may have passed it on to Stalin prior to the latter left for the Potsdam conference.[41]
Document 45: Telegram War [Department] 33556, from Harrison to Secretary of War, July 17, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File 5e (replica from microfilm)
An elated message from Harrison to Stimson reported the success of the Trinity Test of a plutonium implosion weapon. The mild from the explosion could been seen "from right here [Washington, D.C.] to "excessive dangle" [Stimson's estate on Long Island—250 miles away]" and it used to be so loud that Harrison may have heard the "screams" from Washington, D.C. to "my farm" [in Upperville, VA, 50 miles away][42]
Document 46: Memorandum from General L. R. Groves to Secretary of War, "The Test," July 18, 1945, Top Secret, Excised Copy
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 4 (reproduction from microfilm)
General Groves prepared for Stimson, then at Potsdam, a detailed account of the Trinity test.[43]
Document 47: Truman's Potsdam Diary
Source: Barton J. Bernstein, "Truman at Potsdam: His Secret Diary," Foreign Service Journal, July/August 1980, excerpts, used with creator's permission.[44]
Some years after Truman's death, a hand-written diary that he stored all through the Potsdam convention surfaced in his personal papers. For convenience, Barton Bernstein's rendition is equipped here yet related listed here are the scanned versions of Truman's handwriting on the National Archives' web page (for 15-30 July).
The diary entries quilt July 16, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, and 30 and include Truman's occupied with a bunch of issues and developments, including his reactions to Churchill and Stalin, the atomic bomb and how it should be centered, the conceivable have an effect on of the bomb and a Soviet declaration of war on Japan, and his decision to inform Stalin about the bomb. Receptive to power from Stimson, Truman recorded his decision to take Japan's "outdated capital" (Kyoto) off the atomic bomb target checklist. Barton Bernstein and Richard Frank, among others, have argued that Truman's statement that the atomic objectives have been "military targets" advised that either he did not understand the continual of the new weapons or had merely deceived himself about the nature of the targets. Another commentary—"Fini Japs when that [Soviet entry] comes about"—has additionally been the subject of controversy over whether it meant that Truman thought it possible that the war may end with out an invasion of Japan.[45]
Document 48: Stimson Diary entries for July Sixteen through 25, 1945
Source: Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Stimson didn't at all times have Truman's ear, yet historians have steadily cited his diary when he was once at the Potsdam convention. There Stimson saved observe of S-1 trends, together with news of the successful first test (see access for July 16) and the ongoing deployments for nuclear use towards Japan. When Truman received a detailed account of the take a look at, Stimson reported that the "President was enormously pepped up by means of it" and that "it gave him a wholly new feeling of confidence" (see access for July 21). Whether this intended that Truman was once getting in a position for a disagreement with Stalin over Eastern Europe and different issues has also been the topic of debate.
An vital query that Stimson discussed with Marshall, at Truman's request, was once whether or not Soviet entry into the war remained essential to safe Tokyo's give up. Marshall was now not positive whether that used to be so even if Stimson privately believed that the atomic bomb would supply sufficient to power surrender (see access for July 23). This entry has been cited through all sides of the controversy over whether or not Truman was once looking to keep the Soviets out of the war.[46] During the assembly on August 24, mentioned above, Stimson gave his causes for taking Kyoto off the atomic goal checklist: destroying that metropolis would have caused such "bitterness" that it will have change into impossible "to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area fairly than to the Russians." Stimson vainly attempted to keep language in the Potsdam Declaration designed to guarantee the Japanese about "the continuance of their dynasty" but won Truman's assurance that one of these attention could be conveyed later through diplomatic channels (see entry for July 24). Hasegawa argues that Truman learned that the Japanese would refuse a requirement for unconditional surrender and not using a proviso on a constitutional monarchy and that "he needed Japan's refusal to justify the use of the atomic bomb."[47]
Document 49: Walter Brown Diaries, July 10-August 3, 1945
Source: Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. Brown Papers, field 10, folder 12, Byrnes, James F.: Potsdam, Minutes, July-August 1945
Walter Brown, who served as special assistant to Secretary of State Byrnes, saved a diary which equipped substantial detail on the Potsdam conference and the growing concerns about Soviet policy among peak U.S. officials. This document is a typed-up model of the hand-written unique (which Brown's circle of relatives has supplied to Clemson University). That there may be a distinction between the two resources turns into evident from some of the entries; for example, in the entry for July 18, 1945 Brown wrote: "Although I knew about the atomic bomb when I wrote those notes, I dared now not position it in writing in my e-book."
The level to which the typed-up version displays the unique is value investigating. In any event, historians have used knowledge from the diary to beef up quite a lot of interpretations. For instance, Bernstein cites the entries for 20 and 24 July to argue that "American leaders did not view Soviet entry as an alternative choice to the bomb" yet that the latter "could be so robust, and the Soviet presence in Manchuria so militarily important, that there was no use for actual Soviet intervention in the war." For Brown's diary entry of 3 August 9 1945 historians have advanced conflicting interpretations (See discussion of report 57).[48]
Document 50: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1214 – July 22, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
This "Magic" abstract comprises messages from both Togo and Sato. In a protracted and impassioned message, the latter argued why Japan should accept defeat: "it is meaningless to end up one's devotion [to the Emperor] via wrecking the State." Togo rejected Sato's advice that Japan could accept unconditional surrender with one qualification: the "preservation of the Imperial House." Probably unable or unwilling to take a comfortable position in an reliable cable, Togo declared that "the complete nation … will pit itself towards the enemy in response to the Imperial Will as long as the enemy calls for unconditional give up."
Document 51: Forrestal Diary Entry, July 24, 1945, "Japanese Peace Feelers"
Source: Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, James Forrestal Diaries
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was once a typical recipient of "Magic" intercept stories; this considerable access evaluations the dramatic Sato-Togo exchanges covered in the 22 July "Magic" abstract (despite the fact that Forrestal misdated Sato's cable as "first of July" as an alternative of the twenty first). In contrast to Alperovitz's argument that Forrestal attempted to change the terms of unconditional give up to give the Japanese an out, Frank sees Forrestal's account of the Sato-Togo exchange as additional evidence that senior U.S. officers understood that Tokyo was once no longer on the "cusp of surrender." [49]
Document 52: Davies Diary access for July 29, 1945
Source: Joseph E. Davies Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, box 19, 29 July 1945
Having been asked by way of Truman to join the delegation to the Potsdam convention, former-Ambassador Davies sat at the desk with the Big Three all the way through the discussions. This diary access has figured in the argument that Byrnes believed that the atomic bomb gave the United States an important merit in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Plainly Davies thought otherwise.[50]
Document 53: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1221- July 29, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, field 18.
In the Potsdam Declaration the governments of China, Great Britain, and the United States) demanded the "unconditional give up of all Japanese militia. "The selection is advised and utter destruction." The next day, based on questions from reporters about the government's reaction to the ultimatum, Prime Minister Suzuki it sounds as if stated that "We can best ignore [mokusatsu] it. We will do our utmost to finish the war to the sour end." That, Bix argues, represents a "missed opportunity" to end the war and spare the Japanese from persevered U.S. aerial assaults.[51] Togo's personal position used to be more nuanced than Suzuki's; he told Sato that "we're adopting a coverage of careful study." That Stalin had now not signed the declaration (Truman and Churchill did not ask him to) resulted in questions about the Soviet perspective. Togo requested Sato to take a look at to satisfy with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov as soon as possible to "sound out the Russian perspective" on the declaration in addition to Japan's end-the-war initiative. Sato cabled Togo earlier that he saw no point in approaching the Soviets on finishing the war till Tokyo had "concrete proposals." "Any help from the Soviets has now develop into extremely in doubt."
Document 54: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1222 – July 30, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
This document incorporated an intercept of a message from Sato reporting that it was once unimaginable to peer Molotov and that unless the Togo had a "concrete and particular plan for terminating the war" he saw no point in attempting to satisfy with him.
Document 55: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1225 – August 2, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, field 18.
An intercepted message from Togo to Sato confirmed that Tokyo remained thinking about securing Moscow's excellent workplace but that it "is tricky to make a decision on concrete peace prerequisites here at house all at once." "[W]e are exerting ourselves to gather the views of all quarters on the matter of concrete terms." Barton Bernstein, Richard Frank, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, amongst others, have argued that the "Magic" intercepts from the end of July and early August show that the Japanese were far from in a position to give up. According to Herbert Bix, for months Hirohito had believed that the "outlook for a negotiated peace might be improved if Japan fought and won one closing decisive combat," thus, he not on time surrender, proceeding to "procrastinate till the bomb was once dropped and the Soviets attacked."[52]
Document 56: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1226 - August 3, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
This summary included intercepts of Japanese diplomatic reporting on the Soviet buildup in the Far East as well as a naval intelligence record on Anglo-American discussions of U.S. plans for the invasion of Japan. Part II of the abstract contains the relaxation of Togo's 2 August cable which recommended Sato to do what he may to prepare an interview with Molotov.
Document 57: Walter Brown Meeting Notes, August 3, 1945
Source: Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. Brown Papers, field 10, folder 12, Byrnes, James F.: Potsdam, Minutes, July-August 1945
Historians have used this item in the papers of Byrne's aide, Walter Brown, to make a wide range of issues. Richard Frank sees this transient discussion of Japan's passion in Soviet diplomatic help as the most important evidence that Admiral Leahy have been sharing "MAGIC" information with President Truman. He also issues out that Truman and his colleagues had no concept what used to be at the back of Japanese peace strikes, handiest that Suzuki had declared that he would "forget about" the Potsdam Declaration. Alperovitz, on the other hand, treats it as additional proof that "strongly suggests" that Truman saw choices to using the bomb.[53]
Document 58: "Magic" – Far East Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, no. 502, 4 August 1945
Source: RG 457, Summaries of Intercepted Japanese Messages ("Magic" Far East Summary, March 20, 1942 – October 2, 1945), field 7, SRS 491-547
This "Far East Summary" integrated experiences on the Japanese Army's plans to disperse gasoline shares to cut back vulnerability to bombing assaults, the textual content of a directive via the commander of naval forces on "Operation Homeland," the preparations and making plans to repel a U.S. invasion of Honshu, and the specific identification of military divisions located in, or shifting into, Kyushu. Both Richard Frank and Barton Bernstein have used intelligence reporting and analysis of the main buildup of Japanese forces on southern Kyushu to argue that U.S. military planners had been so desirous about this construction that via early August 1945 they have been reconsidering their invasion plans.[54]
Document 59: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1228 – August 5, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18.
This abstract included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed his despair and exasperation over what he noticed as Tokyo's incapability to broaden phrases for ending the war: "[I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this solution to fruition, then all Japan shall be diminished to ashes." Sato remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any hobby in discussions with Tokyo: "it's completely unthinkable that Russia would forget about the Three Power Proclamation after which engage in conversations with our particular envoy."
Documents 60a-d: Framing the Directive for Nuclear Strikes:
60A. Cable VICTORY 213 from Marshall to Handy, July 22, 1945, Top Secret
60B. Memorandum from Colonel John Stone to General Arnold, "Groves Project," 24 July 1945, Top Secret
60C. Cable WAR 37683 from General Handy to General Marshal, enclosing directive to General Spatz, July 24, 1945, Top Secret
60D. Cable VICTORY 261 from Marshall to General Handy, July 25, 1945, 25 July 1945, Top Secret
60E. General Thomas T. Handy to General Carl Spaatz, July 26, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, Files no. 5b and 5e ((copies from microfilm)
Top Army Air Force commanders may not have wanted to take duty for the first use of nuclear weapons on urban goals and sought formal authorization from Chief of Staff Marshall who was once then in Potsdam.[55] On 22 July Marshall asked Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas Handy to arrange a draft; General Groves wrote one that went to Potsdam for Marshall's approval. Colonel John Stone, an assistant to commanding General of the Army Air Forces Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, had simply returned from Potsdam and up to date his boss on the plans as they'd advanced. On 25 July Marshall informed Handy that Secretary of War Stimson had authorized the text; that identical day, Handy signed off on a directive which ordered the use of atomic weapons on Japan, with the first weapon assigned to at least one of 4 imaginable targets—Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki. "Additional bombs will probably be delivery on the [targets] as soon as made in a position via the project group of workers."
Document 61: Memorandum from Major General L. R. Groves to Chief of Staff, July 30, 1945, Top Secret, Sanitized Copy
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5
With more information on the Alamogordo take a look at available, Groves equipped Marshall with element on the destructive power of atomic weapons. Barton J. Bernstein has noticed that Groves' recommendation that troops may transfer into the "immediate explosion discipline" within a part hour demonstrates the prevalent lack of top-level knowledge of the dangers of nuclear guns results.[56] Groves also provided the schedule for the delivery of the weapons: the elements of the gun-type bomb to be used on Hiroshima had arrived on Tinian, whilst the parts of the 2nd weapon to be dropped had been leaving San Francisco. By the end of November over ten guns could be to be had, presumably in the match the war had persevered.
Documents 62A-C: Weather delays
62A. CG 313th Bomb Wing, Tinian cable APCOM 5112 to War Department, August 3, 1945, Top Secret
62B. CG 313th Bomb Wing, Tinian cable APCOM 5130 to War Department, August 4, 1945, Top Secret
62C. CG 313th Bomb Wing, Tinian cable APCOM 5155 to War Department, August 4, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 21 (copies courtesy of Barton Bernstein)
The Hiroshima "operation" was initially slated to start in early August relying on native stipulations. As those cables indicate, experiences of destructive weather behind schedule the plan. The 2nd cable on 4 August displays that the schedule complicated to past due in the night time of 5 August. The handwritten transcriptions are on the unique archival copies.
Document 63: Memorandum from General L. R. Groves to the Chief of Staff, August 6, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5b (reproduction from microfilm)
Two days after the bombing of Hiroshima, Groves supplied Chief of Staff Marshall with a report which integrated messages from Captain William S. Parsons and others about the affect of the detonation which, thru recommended radiation effects, fire storms, and blast results, instantly killed at least 70,000, with many demise later from radiation illness and different causes.[57]
How influential the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and later Nagasaki compared to the impact of the Soviet declaration of war were to the Japanese choice to give up has been the subject of controversy amongst historians. Sadao Asada emphasizes the surprise of the atomic bombs, while Herbert Bix has prompt that Hiroshima and the Soviet declaration of war made Hirohito and his courtroom consider that failure to end the war may lead to the destruction of the imperial space. Frank and Hasegawa divide over the affect of the Soviet declaration of war, with Frank stating that the Soviet intervention was "vital yet not decisive" and Hasegawa arguing that the two atomic bombs "weren't sufficient to switch the course of Japanese diplomacy. The Soviet invasion was once."[58]
Document 64: Walter Brown Diary Entry, 6 August 1945
Source: Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. Brown Papers, field 68, folder 13, "Transcript/Draft B
Returning from the Potsdam Conference, sailing on the U.S.S. Augusta, Truman discovered about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and introduced it two times, first to these in the wardroom (socializing/eating discipline for commissioned officers), and then to the sailors' mess. Still unaware of radiation effects, Truman emphasised the explosive yield. Later, he met with Secretary of State Byrnes they usually discussed the Manhattan Project's secrecy and the huge expenditures. Truman, who had been chair of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, mentioned that "best on the enchantment of Secretary of War Stimson did he refrain and let the War Department continue with the experiment unmolested."
Document 65: Directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East on the Start of Combat Operations, No. 11122, Signed by [Communist Party General Secretary Joseph] Stalin and [Chief of General Staff A.I.] Antonov, 7 August 1945 (translation via Anna Melyakova)
Source: V. A. Zolotarev, ed., Sovetsko-Iaponskaia Voina 1945 Goda: Istoriia Voenno-Politicheskogo Protivoborstva Dvukh Derzhav v 30–40e Gody (Moscow: Terra, 1997 and 2000), Vol. 7 (1), 340-341.
To keep his pledge at Yalta to go into the war against Japan and to protected the territorial concessions promised at the conference (e.g., Soviet annexation of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin and a Soviet naval base at Port Arthur, and many others.) Stalin thought to be more than a few dates to agenda an assault. By early August he determined that 9-10 August 1945 could be the perfect dates for placing Japanese forces in Manchuria. In gentle of Japan's efforts to seek Soviet mediation, Stalin sought after to go into the war quickly lest Tokyo succeed in a compromise peace with the Americans and the British at Moscow's expense. But on 7 August, Stalin changed the instructions: the assault was to begin the next day. According to David Holloway, "it kind of feels most likely that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima the day prior to that impelled [Stalin] to speed up Soviet entry into the war" and "secure the good points promised at Yalta."[59]
Document 66: Memorandum of Conversation, "Atomic Bomb," August 7, 1945
Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman, field 181, Chron File Aug 5-9, 1945.
The Soviets already knew about the U.S. atomic venture from espionage sources in the United States and Britain so Molotov's comment to Ambassador Harriman about the secrecy surrounding the U.S. atomic mission can also be concerned with a grain of salt, although the Soviets have been likely unaware of explicit plans for nuclear use.
Documents 67A-B: Early High-level Reactions to the Hiroshima Bombing
67A: Cabinet Meeting and Togo's Meeting with the Emperor, August 7-8, 1945Source: Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ed. Shusen Shiroku (The Historical Records of the End of the War), annotated by means of Jun Eto, quantity 4, 57-60 [Excerpts] [Translation by Toshihiro Higuchi]
67B: Admiral Tagaki Diary Entry for Wednesday, August 8 , 1945
Source: Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 923-924 [Translation via Hikaru Tajima]
Excerpts from the Foreign Ministry's compilation about the end of the war display how information of the bombing reached Tokyo in addition to how Foreign Minister's Togo initially reacted to studies about Hiroshima. When he discovered of the atomic bombing from the Domei News Agency, Togo believed that it was once time to surrender and advised the cabinet that the atomic assault provided the instance for Japan to surrender on the foundation of the Potsdam Declaration. Togo could now not persuade the cupboard, on the other hand, and the Army sought after to prolong any decisions till it had learned what had took place to Hiroshima. When the Foreign Minister met with the Emperor, Hirohito agreed with him; he declared that the peak precedence used to be an early end to the war, despite the fact that it could be applicable to seek higher surrender terms--probably U.S. acceptance of a figure-head emperor--if it didn't intrude with that purpose. In light of those directions, Togo and Prime Minister Suzuki agreed that the Supreme War Council must meet the next day. [59a]
An entry from Admiral Tagaki's diary for August Eight conveys additional information on the mood in elite Japanese circles after Hiroshima, but earlier than the Soviet declaration of war and the bombing of Nagasaki. Seeing the bombing of Hiroshima as an indication of a worsening scenario at house, Tagaki anxious about further deterioration. Nevertheless, his diary suggests that army hard-liners have been very much in rate and that Prime Minister Suzuki used to be speaking difficult in opposition to surrender, by means of evoking ultimate ditch moments in Japanese historical past and warning of the risk that subordinate commanders might now not obey give up orders. The remaining observation irritated Navy Minister Yonai who noticed it as irresponsible. That the Soviets had made no responses to Sato's request for a gathering was once understood as a foul signal; Yonai learned that the govt needed to get ready for the chance that Moscow would possibly now not lend a hand. One of the guests mentioned at the starting of the access was once Iwao Yamazaki who became Minister of the Interior in the subsequent cupboard.
Document 68: Navy Secretary James Forrestal to President Truman, August 8, 1945
Source: Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, James Forrestal Diaries
General Douglas MacArthur were slated as commander for military operations in opposition to Japan's mainland, this letter to Truman from Forrestal displays that the latter believed that the topic was once now not settled. Richard Frank sees this as proof of the uncertainty felt by means of senior officials about the situation in early August; Forrestal do not need been so "audacious" to take an motion that may just ignite a "political firestorm" if he "significantly thought the end of the war was once near."
Document 69: Memorandum of Conversation, "Far Eastern War and General Situation," August 8, 1945, Top Secret
Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman, field 181, Chron File Aug 5-9, 1945
Shortly after the Soviets declared war on Japan, in step with commitments made at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Ambassador Harriman met with Stalin, with George Kennan holding the U.S. report of the assembly. After Stalin reviewed in considerable element, Soviet army positive factors in the Far East, they discussed the imaginable impact of the atomic bombing on Japan's position (Nagasaki had no longer but been attacked) and the risks and problem of an atomic guns program. According to Hasegawa, this was a very powerful, even "startling," conversation: it confirmed that Stalin "took the atomic bomb significantly"; additionally, he disclosed that the Soviets had been running on their very own atomic program.[60]
Document 70: Entries for 8-9 August, Robert P. Meiklejohn Diary
Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, box 211, Robert Pickens Meiklejohn World War II Diary At London and Moscow March 10, 1941-February 14, 1946, Volume II (Privately published, 1980 [Printed from hand-written originals]) (Reproduced with permission)
Robert P. Meiklejohn, who worked as Ambassador W. A. Harriman's administrative assistant at the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and London all through and after World War II, stored an in depth diary of his reviews and observations. The entries for 8 and 9 August, prepared in gentle of the bombing of Hiroshima, come with dialogue of the British contribution to the Manhattan Project, Harriman ("his nibs'") file on his assembly with Molotov about the Soviet declaration of war, and speculation about the impact of the bombing of Hiroshima on the Soviet decision. According to Meiklejohn, "None of us doubt that the atomic bomb sped up the Soviets' declaration of war."
Document 71: Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 8, 1945 at 10:45 AM
Source: Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
At their first meeting after the shedding of the bomb on Hiroshima, Stimson briefed Truman on the scale of the destruction, with Truman spotting the "terrible accountability" that was on his shoulders. Consistent along with his earlier makes an attempt, Stimson inspired Truman to find ways to expedite Japan's surrender via using "kindness and tact" and not treating them in the identical way as the Germans. They also mentioned postwar law on the atom and the pending Henry D. Smyth record on the medical paintings underlying the Manhattan venture and postwar home controls of the atom.
Documents 72A-C: The Attack on Nagasaki:
72A. Cable APCOM 5445 from General Farrell to O'Leary [Groves assistant], August 9, 1945, Top Secret
72B. COMGENAAF 8 cable CMDW 576 to COMGENUSASTAF, for General Farrell, August 9, 1945, Top secret
72C. COMGENAAF 20 Guam cable AIMCCR 5532 to COMGENUSASTAF Guam, August 10, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, field 20, Envelope G Tinian Files, Top Secret
The high target for the second atomic attack was Kokura, which had a large military arsenal and ordnance works, yet more than a few problems ruled that metropolis out; as an alternative, the group of the B-29 that carried "Fat Man" flew to an alternative goal at Nagasaki. These cables are the earliest reviews of the challenge; the bombing of Nagasaki killed instantly at least 39,000 other people, with more demise later. According to Frank, the "exact general of deaths due to the atomic bombs won't ever be known," but the "massive number" levels someplace between 100,000 and 200,000 people. Barton J. Bernstein and Martin Sherwin have argued that if top Washington policymakers had stored tight regulate of the delivery of the bomb as a substitute of delegating it to Groves the assault on Nagasaki can have been have shyed away from. The mixture of the first bomb and the Soviet declaration of war would were enough to urge Tokyo's surrender. By contrast, Maddox argues that Nagasaki used to be essential so that Japanese "hardliners" may just no longer "minimize the first explosion" or another way give an explanation for it away.[61]
Documents 73A-B: Ramsey Letter from Tinian Island
73A: Letter from Norman Ramsey to J. Robert Oppenheimer, undated [mid-August 1945], Secret, excerptsSource: Library of Congress, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, field 60, Ramsey, Norman
73B: Transcript of the letter prepared by way of editor.
Ramsey, a physicist, served as deputy director of the bomb delivery team, Project Alberta. This personal account, written on Tinian, studies his fears about the risk of a nuclear coincidence, the confusion surrounding the Nagasaki assault, and early Air Force thinking about a nuclear strike drive.
Document 74: "Magic" – Far East Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, no. 507, August 9, 1945
Source: RG 457, Summaries of Intercepted Japanese Messages ("Magic" Far East Summary, March 20, 1942 – October 2, 1945), box 7, SRS 491-547
Within days after the bombing of Hiroshima, U.S. military intelligence intercepted Japanese reports on the destruction of the metropolis. According to an "Eyewitness Account (and Estimates Heard) … In Regard to the Bombing of Hiroshima": "Casualties were estimated at 100,000 persons."
Document 75: "Hoshina Memorandum" on the Emperor's "Sacred Decision [go-seidan]," 9-10 August, 1945
Source: Zenshiro Hoshina, Daitoa Senso Hishi: Hoshina Zenshiro Kaiso-roku [Secret History of the Greater East Asia War: Memoir of Zenshiro Hoshina] (Tokyo, Japan: Hara-Shobo, 1975), excerpts from Section 5, "The Emperor made go-seidan [= the sacred choice] – the determination to terminate the war," 139-149 [translation by means of Hikaru Tajima]
Despite the bombing of Hiroshima, the Soviet declaration of war, and rising concern about home instability, the Japanese cabinet (whose decisions required unanimity) may no longer form a consensus to simply accept the Potsdam Declaration. Members of the Supreme War Council—"the Big Six"[62]—wanted the respond to Potsdam to incorporate at least 4 conditions (e.g., no career, voluntary disarmament); they were willing to fight to the finish. The peace celebration, on the other hand, deftly maneuvered to break the stalemate by persuading a reluctant emperor to intrude. According to Hasegawa, Hirohito had transform convinced that the preservation of the monarchy used to be at stake. Late in the night time of 9 August, the emperor and his advisers met in the bomb safe haven of the Imperial Palace.
Zenshiro Hoshina, a senior naval respectable, attended the convention and prepared an in depth account. With Prime Minister Suzuki presiding, each and every of the ministers had a chance to state their views at once to Hirohito. While Army Minister Anami tacitly threatened a coup ("civil war"), the emperor accepted the majority view that the respond to the Potsdam declaration should include just one situation not the 4 instructed by way of "Big Six." Nevertheless, the situation that Hirohito approved was once not the one that overseas minister Togo had dropped at the convention. What was once at stake was once the definition of the kokutai (national coverage). Togo's proposal would have been normally consistent with a constitutional monarchy because it defined the kokutai narrowly as the emperor and the imperial household. What Hirohito authorized, however, was once a proposal by means of the excessive nationalist Kiichiro Hiranuma which drew upon prevailing understandings of the kokutai: the "mythical perception" that the emperor used to be a living god. "This was the confirmation of the emperor's theocratic powers, unencumbered by way of any law, based on Shinto gods in antiquity, and totally incompatible with a constitutional monarchy." Thus, the Japanese reaction to the Potsdam declaration adversarial "any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of his Majesty as a sovereign ruler." This proved to be unacceptable to the Truman management.[63]
Document 76:"Magic' – Far East Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, no. 508, August 10, 1945
Source: RG 457, Summaries of Intercepted Japanese Messages ("Magic" Far East Summary, March 20, 1942 – October 2, 1945), field 7, SRS 491-547
More intercepted messages on the bombing of Hiroshima.
Documents 77A-B: The First Japanese Offer Intercepted
77A. "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1233 – August 10, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
77B. Translation of intercepted Japanese messages, circa 10 August 10, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18
The first Japanese surrender offer was once intercepted in a while ahead of Tokyo broadcast it. This factor of the diplomatic summary also comprises Togo's account of his notification of the Soviet declaration of war, reports of Soviet army operations in the Far East, and intercepts of French diplomatic traffic. A complete translation of the give up offer was circulated one after the other. The translations range yet they impart the sticking level that averted U.S. acceptance: Tokyo's condition that the allies now not make any "demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler."
Document 78: Diary Entry, Friday, August 10, 1945, Henry Wallace Diary
Source: Papers of Henry A. Wallace, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa (copy courtesy of Special Collections Department)
Note: The 2nd web page of the diary access includes a newspaper clipping of the Associated Press's transmission of the Byrnes word. Unfortunately, AP would now not authorize the Archive to breed this item with out cost. Therefore, we are publishing an excised model of the access, with a link to the Byrnes word.
Secretary of Commerce (and former Vice President) Henry Wallace provided an in depth document on the cabinet meeting where Truman and his advisers mentioned the Japanese surrender offer, Russian moves into Manchuria, and public opinion on "tough" give up phrases. With Japan as regards to capitulation, Truman asserted presidential keep watch over and ordered a halt to atomic bombings. Barton J. Bernstein has advised that Truman's comment about "all those children" confirmed his belated popularity that the bomb led to mass casualties and that the goal was once not purely an army one.[64]
Document 79: Entries for 10-11 August, Robert P. Meiklejohn Diary
Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, field 211, Robert Pickens Meiklejohn World War II Diary At London and Moscow March 10, 1941-February 14, 1946, Volume II (Privately revealed, 1980 [Printed from hand-written originals]) (Reproduced with permission)
In those entries, Meiklejohn discussed how he and others in the Moscow Embassy learned about the bombing of Nagasaki from the "OWI Bulletin." Entries for 10 and 11 August quilt discussion at the Embassy about the radio broadcast saying that Japan would give up as lengthy the Emperor's standing was no longer affected. Harriman opined that "give up is in the bag" because of the Potsdam Declaration's provision that the Japanese may "select their very own form of executive, which might likely include the Emperor." Further, "the handiest choice to the Emperor is Communism," implying that an reliable position for the Emperor used to be important to maintain social stability and prevent social revolution.
Document 80: Stimson Diary Entries, Friday and Saturday, August 10 and 11, 1945
Source: Henry Stimson Diary, Sterling Library, Yale University (microfilm at Library of Congress)
Stimson's account of the occasions of 10 August interested by the debate over the reply to the Japanese word, especially the query of the Emperor's status. The U.S. answer, drafted during the direction of the day, didn't explicitly reject the word but suggested that any perception about the "prerogatives" of the Emperor could be superceded by the idea that all Japanese would be "Subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers." The language was once ambiguous enough to allow Japanese readers, upon Hirohito's urging, to believe that they might decide for themselves the Emperor's long run position. Stimson permitted the language believing that a fast respond to the Japanese would allow the United States to "get the native land into our arms earlier than the Russians may put in any substantial declare to occupy and assist rule it." If the word had incorporated specific provision for a constitutional monarchy, Hasegawa argues, it might have "taken the wind out of the sails" of the army faction and Japan may have surrendered a number of days previous, on August Eleven or 12 as an alternative of August 14.[65]
Document 81: Entries from Walter Brown Diary, 10-11 August 1945
Source: Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter Brown Papers, field 68, folder 13, "Transcript/Draft B
Brown recounted Byrnes' debriefing of the 10 August White House meeting on the Japanese peace be offering, an account which differed relatively from that in the Stimson diary. According to what Byrnes informed Brown, Truman, Stimson, and Leahy favored accepting the Japanese word, yet Byrnes objected that the United States should "pass [no] further than we were prepared to head at Potsdam." Stimson's account of the meeting famous Byrnes' considerations ("bothered and concerned") about the Japanese observe and implied that he (Stimson) liked accepting it, but did not picture the debate as starkly as Browns's did.
Document 82: General L. R. Groves to Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, August 10, 1945, Top Secret, with a hand-written notice by General Marshall
Source: George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA (replica courtesy of Barton J. Bernstein)
Groves knowledgeable General Marshall that he was planning for the use of a 3rd atomic weapon someday after 17 August, depending on the weather. With Truman having ordered a halt to the atomic bombings [See document 78], Marshall wrote on Grove's memo that the bomb used to be "not to be released over Japan with out specific authority from the President."
Document 83: Memorandum of Conversation, "Japanese Surrender Negotiations," August 10, 1945, Top Secret
Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman, box 181, Chron File Aug 10-12, 1945
Japan's potential give up was once the subject of detailed discussion between Harriman, British Ambassador Kerr, and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov during the night of August 10 (with a follow-up assembly happening at 2 a.m.). In the path of the dialog, Harriman received a message from Washington that incorporated the proposed U.S. answer and a request for Soviet fortify of the answer. After substantial pressure from Harriman, the Soviets signed off on the reply but now not before tensions surfaced over the keep an eye on of Japan--whether Moscow would have a Supreme Commander there as smartly. This marked the beginning of a U.S.-Soviet "tug of war" over occupation preparations for Japan.[66]
Document 84: Admiral Tagaki Diary Entry for 12 August [1945]Source: Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 926-927 [Translation via Hikaru Tajima]
As more than a few factions in the govt maneuvered on how to answer the Byrnes word, Navy Minister Yonai and Admiral Tagaki discussed the newest traits. Yonai was once upset that Chief of Staff Yoshijiro Umezu and naval leader Suemu Toyada had despatched the emperor a memorandum arguing that acceptance of the Brynes word would "desecrate the emperor's dignity" and turn Japan into virtually a "slave nation." The emperor chided Umezu and Toyoda for drawing hasty conclusions; on this he had the support of Yonai, who additionally dressed them down. As Yonai defined to Tagaki, he had additionally confronted naval vice Chief Takijiro Onishi to ensure that he obeyed any determination via the Emperor. Yonai made certain that Takagi understood his reasons for bringing the war to an end and why he believed that the atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war had made it more straightforward for Japan to surrender.[67]
Document 85: Memorandum from Major General Clayton Bissell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Chief of Staff, "Estimate of Japanese Situation for Next 30 Days," August 12, 1945, Top Secret
Source: National Archives, RG 165, Army Operations OPD, Executive Files 1940-1945, field 12, Exec #2
Not altogether certain that surrender used to be approaching, Army intelligence didn't rule out the risk that Tokyo would attempt to "drag out the negotiations" or reject the Byrnes proposal and proceed preventing. If the Japanese decided to stay fighting, G-2 opined that "Atomic bombs will not have a decisive effect in the next 30 days." Richard Frank has identified that this and different paperwork indicate that high level military figures remained not sure as to how close Japan in point of fact was to surrender.
Document 86: The Cabinet Meeting over the Reply to the Four Powers (August 13)
Source: Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shusen Shiroku [Historical Record of the End of the War] (Tokyo: Hokuyosha, 1977-1978), vol. 5, 27-35 [Translated by means of Toshihiro Higuchi]
The Byrnes Note didn't break the stalemate at the cabinet point. An account of the cupboard debates on August 13 prepared through Information Minister Toshiro Shimamura confirmed the identical divisions as prior to; Anami and a couple of different ministers endured to argue that the Allies threatened the kokutai and that surroundings the four prerequisites (no career, etc.) didn't imply that the war would continue. Nevertheless, Anami argued, "We are still left with some power to combat." Suzuki, who was once working quietly with the peace party, declared that the Allied phrases have been acceptable as a result of they gave a "dim hope in the darkish" of keeping the emperor. At the end of the meeting, he announced that he would report back to Hirohito and ask him to make any other "Sacred Judgment". Meanwhile, junior Army officers plotted a coup to thwart the plans for give up.[68]
Document 87: Telephone conversation transcript, General Hull and Colonel Seaman [sic] – 1325 – 13 Aug 45, Top Secret
Source: George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, VA, George C. Marshall Papers (replica courtesy of Barton J. Bernstein)
While Truman had rescinded the order to drop nuclear bombs, the war used to be no longer yet over and uncertainty about Japan's next step motivated war planner General John E. Hull (assistant chief of body of workers for the War Department's Operations Division), and one of Groves' mates, Colonel L. E. Seeman, to proceed fascinated by additional nuclear use and its dating to a conceivable invasion of Japan. As Hull defined, "should we no longer pay attention to goals that can be of largest help to an invasion quite than trade, morale, psychology, and so forth." "Nearer the tactical use", Seaman agreed and so they mentioned the tactics that could be used for seaside landings. In 1991 articles, Barton Bernstein and Marc Gallicchio used this and other proof to broaden the argument that ideas of tactical nuclear guns use first got here to gentle at the shut of World War II.[69]
Document 88: "Magic" – Diplomatic Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, No. 1236 – August 13, 1945, Top Secret Ultra
Source: Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "Magic" Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, field 18
The shedding of two atomic bombs, the tremendous destruction caused via U.S. bombing, and the Soviet declaration of war notwithstanding, vital components of the Japanese Army were unwilling to yield, as was once evident from intercepted messages dated 12 and 13 August. Willingness to accept even the "destruction of the Army and Navy" slightly than surrender inspired the military coup that opened up and failed all over the night of 14 August.
Document 89: "The Second Sacred Judgment", August 14, 1945
Source: Hiroshi [Kaian) Shimomura, Shusenki [Account of the End of the War] (Tokyo, Kamakura Bunko, [1948], 148-152 [Translated by means of Toshihiro Higuchi]
Frightened by means of the rapid motion of Soviet forces into Manchuria and nervous that the military would possibly launch a coup, the peace celebration set in motion a plan to influence Hirohito to meet with the cupboard and the "Big Six" to get to the bottom of the stalemate over the response to the Allies. Japan used to be already an afternoon past due in responding to the Byrnes Note and Hirohito agreed to transport temporarily. At 10:50 a.m., he met with the management at the bomb safe haven in his palace. This account, ready by Director of Information Shimomura, conveys the drama of the occasion (as well as his passion in shifting the blame for the debacle to the Army). After Suzuki gave the war party--Umeda, Toyoda, and Anami--an alternative to provide their arguments in opposition to accepting the Byrnes Note, he requested the emperor to talk.
Hirohito requested the leadership to simply accept the Note, which he believed was "well intentioned" on the matter of the "nationwide polity" (via leaving open a conceivable function for the Emperor). Arguing that continuing the war would cut back the nation "to ashes," his words about "bearing the unbearable" and sadness over wartime losses and suffering prefigured the language that Hirohito would use in his public announcement the subsequent day. According to Bix, "Hirohito's language helped to become him from a war to a peace chief, from a chilly, aloof monarch to a human being who cared for his other folks" yet "what mainly motivated him … used to be his want to save a politically empowered throne with himself on it."[70]
Hirohito mentioned that he would make a recording of the surrender announcement so that the nation could pay attention it. That night time military officials tried to grab the palace and discover Hirohito's recording, yet the coup failed. Early the subsequent day, General Anami committed suicide. On the morning of August 15, Hirohito broadcast the message to the country (even if he by no means used the word "surrender"). A few weeks later, on September 2, 1945 Japanese representatives signed give up documents on the USS Missouri, in Tokyo harbor.[71]
Document 90: "Magic" – Far East Summary, War Department, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, no. 515, August 18, 1945
Source: RG 457, Summaries of Intercepted Japanese Messages ("Magic" Far East Summary, March 20, 1942 – October 2, 1945), box 7, SRS 491-547
This summary contains an intercepted account of the destruction of Nagasaki.
Document 91:Washington Embassy Telegram 5599 to Foreign Office, 14 August 1945, Top Secret[72]
Source: The British National Archives, Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FO 800/461
With the Japanese give up announcement now not but in, President Truman believed that some other atomic bombing might turn out to be necessary. After a White House meeting on 14 August, British Minister John Balfour reported that Truman had "remarked sadly that he now had no selection but to reserve an atomic bomb to be dropped on Tokyo." This was once most probably emotional thinking spurred via anxiousness and uncertainty. Truman was once it sounds as if now not considering the reality that Tokyo was once already devastated by fireplace bombing and that an atomic bombing would have killed the Emperor, which would have very much complicated the procedure of surrender. Moreover, he may not have identified that the third bomb was once nonetheless in the United States and would no longer be to be had for use for nearly any other week.[73] As it turned out, a few hours later, at 4:05 p.m., the White House gained the Japanese give up announcement.
Document 92: P.L. Henshaw and R.R. Coveyou to H.J. Curtis and Ok. Z. Morgan, "Death from Radiation Burns," 24 August 1945, Confidential
Source: Department of Energy Open-Net
Two scientists at Oak Ridge's Health Division, Henshaw and Coveyou, noticed a United Press report in the Knoxville News Sentinel about radiation illness brought about by the bombings. Victims who seemed wholesome weakened, "for unknown causes" and plenty of died. Lacking direct wisdom of conditions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Henshaw and Coveyou had their very own knowledge on the organic results of radiation and may make educated guesses. After reviewing the affect of more than a few atomic bomb effects--blast, heat, flash radiation (prompt effects from gamma waves), and radiation from radioactive substances--they concluded that "it sort of feels highly plausible that an excellent many persons were subjected to lethal and sub-lethal dosages of radiation in spaces the place direct blast effects have been most likely non-lethal." It used to be "possible," therefore, that radiation "would produce increments to the loss of life fee and "much more possible" that a "nice number of instances of sub-lethal exposures to radiation have been suffered."[74]
Document 93: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between General Groves and Lt. Col. Rea, Oak Ridge Hospital, 9:00 a.m., August 28, 1945, Top Secret
Source: RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. 5b
Despite the stories pouring in from Japan about radiation illness amongst the sufferers of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, General Groves and Dr. Charles Rea, a surgeon who was once head of the base clinic at Oak Ridge (and had no specialized knowledge about the organic results of radiation) dismissed the experiences as "propaganda". Unaware of the findings of Health Division scientists, Groves and Rhea noticed the accidents as nothing greater than "excellent thermal burns."[75]
Documents 94A-B: General Farrell Surveys the Destruction
94A. Cable CAX 51813 from USS Teton to Commander in Chief Army Forces Pacific Administration, From Farrell to Groves, September 10, 1945, Secret
94B. Cable CAX 51948 from Commander in Chief Army Forces Pacific Advance Yokohoma Japan to Commander in Chief Army Forces Pacific Administration, September 14, 1945, Secret
Source: RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 17, Envelope B
A month after the attacks Groves' deputy, General Farrell, traveled to Japan to look for himself the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. His shiny account presentations that senior military officers in the Manhattan Project had been no longer dismissive of reports of radiation poisoning. As Farrell seen in his discussion of Hiroshima, "Summaries of Japanese reports up to now despatched are essentially right kind, as to clinical results from unmarried gamma radiation dose." Such findings dismayed Groves, who anxious that the bomb would fall into a taboo category like chemical guns, with all the concern and horror surrounding them. Thus, Groves and others would attempt to suppress findings about radioactive results, even if that was once a losing proposition.[76]
Document 95: Entry for 4 October 1945, Robert P. Meiklejohn Diary
Source: W.A. Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, box 211, Robert Pickens Meiklejohn World War II Diary At London and Moscow March 10, 1941-February 14, 1946, Volume II (Privately revealed, 1980 [Printed from hand-written originals]) (Reproduced with permission)
In this entry written several months later, Meiklejohn shed light on what much later changed into an element of the controversy over the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombings: whether any high point civilian or military officials objected to nuclear use. Meiklejohn recounted Harriman's discuss with in early October 1945 to the Frankfurt-area residence of General Dwight Eisenhower, who was once completing up his provider as Commanding General, U.S. Army, European Theater. It used to be Meiklejohn's birthday and all through the dinner social gathering, Eisenhower and McCloy had a captivating dialogue of atomic weapons, which incorporated comments alluding to scientists' statements about what appears to be the H-bomb undertaking (a 20 megaton weapon), recollection of the early worry that an atomic detonation may fritter away the atmosphere, and the Navy's reluctance to use its battleships to check atomic guns. At the beginning of the dialogue, Eisenhower made a vital commentary: he "mentioned how he had was hoping that the war may have ended without our having to make use of the atomic bomb." The general implication was that previous to Hiroshima-Nagasaki, he had wanted to avoid using the bomb.
Some may associate this observation with one that Eisenhower later recalled making to Stimson. In his 1948 memoirs (further amplified in his 1963 memoirs), Eisenhower claimed that he had "expressed the hope [to Stimson] that we would by no means have to make use of this type of factor against an enemy because I disliked seeing the United States take the lead in introducing into war one thing as horrible and damaging as this new weapon used to be described to be." That language might mirror the underlying thinking at the back of Eisenhower's commentary all over the dinner party, but whether or not Eisenhower used such language when speaking with Stimson has been a matter of controversy. In later years, those who knew both thought it not likely that the basic would have expressed misgivings about using the bomb to a civilian awesome. Eisenhower's son John cast doubts about the memoir statements, even if he attested that when the basic first realized about the bomb he was downcast.
Stimson's diary mentions conferences with Eisenhower two times in the weeks prior to Hiroshima, but without any mention of a dissenting Eisenhower commentary (and Stimson's diaries are relatively detailed on atomic issues). The access from Meiklejohn's diary does no longer prove or disprove Eisenhower's recollection, however it does confirm that he had doubts which he expressed just a few months after the bombings. Whether Eisenhower expressed such reservations previous to Hiroshima will remain a matter of controversy.[77]
Document 96: President Harry S. Truman, Handwritten Remarks for Gridiron Dinner, circa 15 December 1945[78]
Source: Harry S. Truman Library, President's Secretary's Files, Speech Files, 1945-1953, replica on U.S. National Archives Web Site
On 15 December, President Truman spoke about the atomic bombings in his speech at the annual dinner of the Gridiron Club, organized by way of bureau chiefs and other leading figures of print media organizations. Besides Truman, visitors incorporated New York Governor Thomas Dewey (Republican presidential candidate in 1944 and 1948), international ambassadors, individuals of the cupboard and the Supreme Court, the military high command, and various senators and representatives. The U.S. Marine Band supplied track for the dinner and for the variety display that was carried out by means of participants of the press. [79]
In accordance with the dinner's rules that "reporters are by no means provide," Truman's remarks had been off-the document. The president, however, wrote in long-hand a textual content that that might approximate what he stated that night time. Pages 12 through 15 of the ones notes check with the atomic bombing of Japan:
"You know the most terrible resolution a man ever needed to make was once made by me at Potsdam. It had not anything to do with Russia or Britain or Germany. It was a choice to free the maximum horrible of all damaging forces for the wholesale slaughter of human beings. The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and I weighed that choice maximum prayerfully. But the President needed to make a decision. It befell to me that a quarter of a million of the flower of our younger manhood was worth a pair of Japanese cities, and I still assume that they had been and are. But I couldn't lend a hand yet assume of the necessity of blotting out ladies and kids and non-combatants. We gave them fair caution and requested them to quit. We picked a pair of towns where war paintings was the concept business, and dropped bombs. Russia moved quickly in and the war ended."
Truman characterized the Potsdam Declaration as a "truthful caution," but it surely was once an ultimatum. Plainly he used to be troubled via the devastation and struggling led to by means of the bombings, yet he found it justifiable as it stored the lives of U.S. troops. His estimate of 250,000 U.S. soldiers spared far exceeded that made by means of General Marshall in June 1945, which used to be in the vary of 31,000 (similar to the Battle of Luzon) [See Document 26]. By bringing up an inflated casualty figure, the president was giving a tribulation run for the rationale that would change into central to legitimate and semi-official discourse about the bombings all the way through the decades forward.[80]
Despite Truman's claim that he made "the most horrible" resolution at Potsdam, he assigned himself extra accountability than the historical record helps. On the fundamental decision, he had simply concurred with the judgments of Stimson, Groves, and others that the bomb would be used as quickly because it used to be available for army use. As for targeting, however, he had a more important function. At Potsdam, Stimson raised his objections to targeting Japan's cultural capital, Kyoto, and Truman supported the secretary's efforts to drop that city from the goal record [See Documents 47 and 48]. [81]
Where he had taken significant duty used to be by way of you make a decision to stop the atomic bombings just earlier than the Japanese surrender, thereby announcing presidential keep watch over over nuclear weapons
Note:
The editor thank you Barton J. Bernstein, J. Samuel Walker, Gar Alperovitz, David Holloway, and Alex Wellerstein for his or her recommendation and help, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa for kindly offering copies of some of the Japanese sources that have been translated for this compilation. Hasegawa's e book, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2005), contains helpful information on Japanese assets. David Clark, an archivist at the Harry S. Truman Library, and James Cross, Manuscripts Archivist at Clemson University Library's Special Collections, kindly provided subject matter from their collections. The editor also thanks Kyle Hammond and Gregory Graves for research assistance and Toshihiro Higuchi and Hikaru Tajima (who then have been graduate scholars in history at Georgetown University and the University of Tokyo respectively), for translating paperwork and answering questions about the Japanese sources. The editor thank you Anna Melyakova (National Security Archive) for translating Russian language material.
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